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OPERATION "DRIVE OUT THE TRASH":




In May 2005, representatives of President Robert Mugabe's government
initiated a slum-clearance campaign entitled Operation Murambatsvina,
which displaced nearly one million Zimbabweans. Using Operation
Murambatsvina as a case study, this Note examines how the United Nations
(U.N.) should respond to governments that violate the human rights of those
living within their borders. Exploring arguments for and against the
various responses available to the U.N., this Note argues that targeted
sanctions are the most appropriate response to the abuses perpetrated by
the Mugabe regime and offers suggestions for crafting a "smart" sanctions
program.
INTRODUCTION
Please ask Mugabe what it is they want from us. What is the dirt they
want to clear out-is it us?1
Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabweans have been President
Robert Mugabe's passengers on a wild ride from hopes of postcolonial
peace 2 to a reality marked by violence and discord. Starting with Operation
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; M.A. Candidate, 2008,
International Political Economy and Development, Fordham University Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences. I extend my deepest gratitude to the many Zimbabweans who welcomed
me into their country. I would also like to thank Jim Leitner; Professors Rachel Vorspan,
Jeanmarie Fenrich, and Susanna Chung; and Alasdair Ferguson for their invaluable support
and comments.
1. Anonymous statement by a woman from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second city, who
lost her "home and livelihood" during the government's 2005 slum-clearance campaign,
Operation Murambatsvina. Amnesty Int'l, Zimbabwe: No Justice for the Victims of Forced
Evictions, at intro., Al Index AFR 46/005/2006, Sept. 8, 2006. Murambatsvina is a Shona-
language word that translates into English as "drive out the trash." See Sokwanele, Thrown
on the Scrapheap, Guardian Unlimited, June 10, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,1504010,00.html.
2. On the day Robert Mugabe was first elected prime minister of Zimbabwe in March
1980, he declared his intentions to rule over a peaceful nation: "I wish to assure you that
there can never be any return to the state of armed conflict which existed before our
commitment to peace and the democratic process of election under the Lancaster House
agreement." BBC On This Day, 4 March 1980: Mugabe to Lead Independent Zimbabwe,
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Gukurahundi 3 in the 1980s and continuing with a controversial "fast-track"
land-redistribution program,4  Mugabe's leadership has resulted in
successive waves of trauma for the nation, including food riots in 1997 and
2003, 5 an internationally condemned presidential election in 2002,6 and,
beginning in May 2005, a massive slum-clearance program entitled
Operation Murambatsvina and its ineffective follow-up rehousing plan,
Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle. 7 President Mugabe now rules over a
failing state, where corruption, poverty, unemployment, repression, and
despair are the norm.8
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid-2515000/2515 145.stm (last
visited Aug. 20, 2007); see also Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding
Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the
U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe 15 (2005) (discussing the
historical context of the crisis in Zimbabwe).
3. Operation Gukurahundi is the name given to the government's campaign of mass
murder, torture, and detention that took place in western Zimbabwe in the 1980s. See
generally The Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe & The Legal Resources
Found., Breaking the Silence/Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 to 1988 (2001); John Sweeney, Zimbabwe Burning,
BBC News World Edition, Mar. 3, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent1852133.stm.
4. Beginning in the 1990s, Mugabe implemented a controversial campaign to
redistribute white-owned arable lands to black Zimbabweans. The plan required
compensation payments to landowners but soon became corrupt and characterized by violent
seizures of white-owned farms. See Human Rights Watch, Fast Track Land Reform in
Zimbabwe 11-18 (2002). See generally John McClung Nading, Comment, Property Under
Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 737 (2002)
(describing the disastrous fast-track land-redistribution program implemented by the Mugabe
government).
5. In response to drastic increases in food prices in 1997 and 2003, Zimbabweans took
to the streets to protest. To quell the demonstrations and alleged looting, the government
deployed the army and police, which resulted in civilian deaths. See Zimbabwe Food Riots
Spread, BBC News World Edition, Jan. 6, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2631263.stm; see also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum, A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots: 19-23 January, 1998,
http://www.hrforumzim.com/members-reports/foodriots98/food9801a.htm (last visited Sept.
2, 2007).
6. See Iden Wetherell, 'Sanction's Rage' Turned on Citizens, Zimbabwe Indep., Aug.
2, 2002, reprinted in World Press Rev. Online, Oct. 2002,
http://www.worldpress.org/1002toc.htm (detailing 2002's election irregularities, including
the "appointment of army and intelligence officers to run the March poll, the last-minute
manipulation of electoral rules, the addition of 400,000 people to the voters' roll after it had
been legally closed, the partisan role of the police, and the arrest of poll monitors").
7. Garikai and Hlalani Kuhle may be translated respectively from the Shona and the
Ndbele into English as "Live Well." Solidarity Peace Trust, "Meltdown"-Murambatsvina
One Year On 7 (2006).
8. The Mugabe government's latest crackdown on opposition party members and civic
leaders in early 2007 resulted in reports of beatings and at least one death. See Michael
Wines, In Zimbabwe, an Embattled Government Responds to Political Unrest with Violence,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2007, § I, at 14. As a result of continuing violence and the economic
crisis, Zimbabweans have been leaving the country "en masse." Justin Pearce, So Where Are
Zimbabweans Going?, BBC News, Nov. 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4416820.stm. In addition to those emigrating, more than 3000 Zimbabweans die each week
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In Zimbabwe, the movement toward urbanization, which began with
independence and the repeal of racially restrictive laws, 9 grew as the
economy suffered through the 1990s and strengthened with the land-
redistribution program. The end result was a flourishing informal
economy. 10 While slums in Zimbabwe grew at a slower rate than in many
other postcolonial African nations, after the land seizures of the late 1990s
and early 2000s, "slum pockets"' "I began to spring up in and around urban
areas. Moreover, for many years poor urban dwellers relied on other
"informal and unauthorised"' 12 housing alternatives, most frequently
multiple "backyard extensions,"'13 which were added on to preexisting
homes; these extensions were essentially shacks that shared the plumbing
and sanitation facilities of permanent homes.
Allegedly in response to this trend toward urbanization, in May 2005 the
government announced Operation Murambatsvina, a massive "clean-up"' 14
operation in Harare, which continued throughout 2006.15 Branded as a
crackdown on illegal activity, 16 Operation Murambatsvina initially focused
on vendors in the informal markets. 17 As the army and the police swept
through the nation arbitrarily arresting flea-market traders, 18 they also
dismantled, torched, and demolished thousands of structures serving as
homes and market stalls, beating those who resisted arrest or refused to
participate in the demolition of their own homes. 19 Locals referred to the
due to AIDS-related illnesses. See Human Rights Watch, No Bright Future: Government
Failures, Human Rights Abuses and Squandered Progress in the Fight Against AIDS in
Zimbabwe 17 (2006); Int'l Crisis Group, Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: The
Tipping Point? 2 (2005) (observing that Zimbabwe's problems are "primarily man-made, a
mixture of failed governance, food insecurity and manipulation of food for political ends,
and economic meltdown, including triple digit inflation, over 70 per cent unemployment,
and large shortages of consumer items, fuel and foreign currency"). As a result, few
Zimbabweans remain who are willing or able to stand up against the oppression the Mugabe
government has long inflicted on its people.
9. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 22.
10. See id. at 22-23.
11. Id. at25.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Regardless of announcements made in 2005 that the operation had been successfully
completed, local and international media continued to report instances of government-
sponsored evictions and destruction throughout 2006. Int'l Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: An
End to the Stalemate? 4 (2007). International Crisis Group reported in March 2007 that
government officials are preparing for "a new wave of demolitions of homes and illegal
business structures." Id; see also Blessing Zulu & Carole Gombakomba, Harare Police
Round Up Thousands Ahead of Slum-Clearance Anniversary, Voice of America, May 15,
2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-15-voa53.cfm.
16. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 87.
17. By June 2005, the informal market supported at least 8 to 9 million people, while the
formal economy provided income for only 1.3 million. See id. at 17.
18. Within the first week of the operation, a reported 20,000 vendors were arrested. See
id. at 12.
19. Id.
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destruction as Operation Tsunami,20 a reflection of the havoc it wreaked on
the lives of the more than 700,000 people who lost their homes and jobs and
the 2.4 million others who felt its more indirect effects. 2 1 Ultimately,
Operation Murambatsvina devastated Zimbabwe, a nation with an official
population of fewer than 13 million.
22
While Murambatsvina's destruction has been extensively chronicled, the
campaign must also be understood as a symptom of greater problems.
Domestically, Zimbabwe is home to an economy free falling at record
speed, one of the world's highest HIV/AIDS infection rates, a judiciary that
has failed to remain independent, a deeply disappointing agricultural reform
program, and an army and police force that often seem to be operating
above the law. 23 Within the larger African context, the operation provides
an opportunity to reflect on a challenge much of the continent faces: the
rise of slums resulting from rapid postcolonial urbanization. 24 In fact, the
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions estimates that from 2003 through
2006 nearly two million African residents were evicted forcibly from their
homes, while more than four million were evicted worldwide.25 In most
cases, these forced evictions were targeted at "the poor, living in informal
settlements or in slums." 26  Slums present problems of overburdened
20. See Rasna Warah, Chaotic Urban Transition in Africa: Zimbabwe Evictions Come
at a Heavy Cost, U.N. Chronicle Online Edition, Sept.-Nov. 2005,
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2005/issue3/O305p30.html; see also Tibaijuka, supra note
2, at 12.
21. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 7.
22. According to International Crisis Group, Operation Murambatsvina exacerbated the
already difficult living conditions in Zimbabwe, increasing the "number of people in need of
humanitarian assistance, since orphans, widows, women, the chronically ill, elderly and
disabled persons and households headed by children bore its brunt." Int'l Crisis Group,
supra note 8, at 2. For details on Zimbabwe's population data, see The World Bank Group,
Table 2.1: Population Dynamics,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table2_l.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
23. See Editorial, The Agonies of Zimbabwe, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2006, at AI8; see also
Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 62 (expressing concern at the judiciary's inability to remain
independent from Zimbabwean politics). In 2003, the last year for which data was collected,
more than half of the nation's population suffered shortages in basic food and nonfood
needs; malnutrition among children and inability to access health care increased by 35%;
approximately 18% of the population suffered from HIV/AIDS; unemployment increased to
more than 70%; and average life expectancy decreased to thirty-six years. Editorial, supra.
In addition, in August 2006, the Zimbabwean government instituted a currency reform plan,
Operation Sunrise, to cut inflation, which has since been deemed a failure. Michael Wines,
Zimbabwe, Subtracting Zeros, Adds to Discontent, N.Y. Times, Aug., 8, 2006, at A6. As of
July 2007, the nation's official inflation rate had reached 7638%, with the unofficial rate
estimated at 13,000%. See Zimbabwe Inflation Hits New High, BBC News, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6959164.stm.
24. See generally Press Release, UN-HABITAT, New UN-HABITAT Report Says
Urban Dwellers Badly Off (June 19, 2006), available at
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=3177&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuld=0.
25. See The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Draft Global Survey on Forced
Evictions: Violations of Human Rights 11 (2006).
26. Id. at preface.
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sanitation systems, spread infectious diseases, and give rise to unsafe living
and working conditions. 27 Unfortunately, these broader problems show no
signs of abating. 28
Conscious of this situation, few critics, including Zimbabweans, argue
that the status quo in urban health and safety prior to the operation was
acceptable. 29 If one disregards reports of alleged political motivations for
the operation, its official purpose-to clean up Zimbabwean cities-could
have been noble. However, due to the seemingly haphazard
implementation of the operation and the lack of alternative housing and
employment plans in place prior to its initiation, doubts persist about the
true motivations behind the program.
As a case study, this Note examines the human rights abuses perpetrated
by the Zimbabwean government during Operation Murambatsvina and
argues that, in response to these and similar abuses around the globe, the
United Nations (U.N.) should impose targeted sanctions on government
officials, including freezing their assets, banning them from international
travel, blocking shipments of luxury goods and military equipment, and
prohibiting trade with businesses and industries owned by such officials.
Although the implementation of sanctions remains a controversial area,30
such measures, if carefully crafted, offer an effective response to violations
of international human rights norms and treaties. The objective of these
sanctions would be to coerce officials into observing international human
rights norms, in this case by adhering to Zimbabwe's announced policy of
rehousing the displaced, as outlined in Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle. 3 1
Sanctions would also symbolize international outrage at the perpetration of
gross human rights violations, demonstrating that the major powers of the
U.N. disapprove of the Mugabe government's brutal treatment of its own
people. Such a message would deter other nations from committing similar
human rights violations. The U.N.'s growing reliance upon sanctions over
the past fifteen years3 2 and the lessons learned in the implementation of
these programs provide a base of experience for crafting an effective
program.
Part I of this Note offers an overview of the situation in Zimbabwe
specifically, including a description of Operations Murambatsvina and
Garikai. Part I also examines the main options available to the U.N. in
response to gross violations of international human rights norms, exploring
the various types of sanctions, and looks at the U.N.'s response to the
abuses in Zimbabwe thus far. Part II examines the debate surrounding
27. See, e.g., Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 80-83.
28. See The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, supra note 25, at preface.
29. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 22-23 (describing the situation in urban areas prior to
the operation).
30. See infra Part II.B.4.
31. See infra Part L.B.
32. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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Zimbabwe's legal accountability for Operation Murambatsvina and
explores the criticisms of, and counterarguments against, the
implementation of each of the potential U.N. responses, especially those
relating to sanctions. Finally, Part III argues that sanctions are the only
viable U.N. response to the Zimbabwean crisis and are justified with respect
to legal, political, economic, and humanitarian concerns. Part III concludes
by recommending a specific targeted sanctions program, tailored to suit
Zimbabwe's needs. In making these arguments, this Note suggests a way
for the international community to exert pressure on those responsible for
human rights abuses, such as those perpetrated during Operation
Murambatsvina, and also ensures that those affected by this brutal
campaign are not forgotten.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE, THE POSSIBLE U.N.
RESPONSES, AND THE CURRENT U.N. RESPONSE
Beginning on or around May 17, 2005, 33 and continuing through 2006,
the Zimbabwean government initiated Operation Murambatsvina, a slum-
clearance program that initially targeted vendors and residents of
Zimbabwe's poorest and most densely populated urban areas and then
reached into the rural areas. 34 By July 2005, with hundreds of thousands of
people left homeless and deprived of their livelihoods, the government
responded to the crisis it had created by launching a follow-up program,
Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, which aspired to provide housing and
jobs for those affected by Murambatsvina. 35 Garikai is ongoing, but it has
been widely condemned as a failure, conceived only after Murambatsvina
and promising goals that were always beyond its reach.36 Moreover, the
33. The exact date of the operation's inception varies according to reports; however, the
United Nations (U.N.) reports that the destruction began as early as May 17, 2005. See
Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 31.
34. See id. at 12-13; Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, Order Out of Chaos, or Chaos
Out of Order? A Preliminary Report on Operation "Murambatsvina" 7 (2005).
35. See Gov't of Zimb., Response by the Government of Zimbabwe to the Report by the
U.N. Special Envoy on Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order 6 (2005) (describing the
object of Operation Garikai as a means of providing "decent and affordable accommodation"
and promoting "small and medium scale business enterprises"); see also Tibaijuka, supra
note 2, at 47-50. In her report, Tibaijuka writes that Operation Garikai seemed "hastily"
planned and that the government's ability to satisfy the immediate housing needs of those
displaced was "severely limited." Id. at 49.
36. See Carole Gombakomba, Senior UNDP Official Measures Progress Housing
Zimbabwe's Evicted, Voice of America, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-12/2006-12-06-voa47.cfm (citing a lack of
funds and widespread corruption as the reasons for Garikai's failure); see also Amnesty Int'l,
supra note 1, at 9-10 (describing how Operation Garikai did not appear in any published
government plans during the years 2004-08 and how the failure to provide for such plans
prior to forced evictions conflicts with the guidelines issued by the U.N. Committee on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on adequate
housing).
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U.N. response to the operations has been limited, with efforts to provide
humanitarian relief often frustrated by the Mugabe government. 37
Part L.A offers a brief history of events prior to Operation Murambatsvina
and then investigates the immediate and long-term effects of the campaign.
Part I.B explores the failure of Operation Garikai to rehouse and employ
those affected by it. In Part I.C, the Note shifts focus to offer an overview
of the possible responses available to the U.N., including the various types
of sanctions. Part I.D investigates the U.N.'s response thus far to the
humanitarian crisis created and exacerbated by both operations.
A. Operation Murambatsvina
Operation Murambatsvina, and the failure of Operation Garikai to
provide relief to its victims, exacerbated the problems of an already
vulnerable population. Not only did the Zimbabwean "tsunami" 38 directly
affect hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers, but it also carried long-term
consequences that have affected food security, health, education, and the
economy.
1. A Brief Political History of Zimbabwe
Since independence, the Zimbabwean political, economic, and urban
landscape has changed considerably. In 1980, after an extended period of
guerrilla warfare in response to then-Prime Minister Ian Smith's policy of
white-minority rule, 39 President Mugabe took control of what appeared to
be a "relatively sophisticated and diversified economy." 40 However, it soon
became clear that the economy was already suffering "from a large fiscal
deficit, low economic performance, high unemployment, price controls, and
a lack of foreign currency," 4 1 all of which would only increase in severity
in the coming years. President Mugabe's accession also brought the
dismantling of strict systems of segregation between blacks and whites and
the loosening of restrictions on the movement of workers. 42 As a result, the
urban population increased "from 23% in 1982 to 30% by the early
1990s, ' 43 as Zimbabweans migrated in pursuit of work to cities whose
37. See infra Part I.A.3.c.
38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39. BBC On This Day, 24 September 1976: White Rule in Rhodesia to End,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/24/newsid-2537000/2537969.stm
(last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
40. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 16.
41. Id.
42. See supra text accompanying note 9. See generally Teresa Barnes, "Am I a Man?
Gender and the Pass Laws in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe, 1930-80, 40 Afr. Stud. Rev. 59
(1997) (discussing bureaucratic laws in pre-independence Zimbabwe that aimed to restrict
labor mobility).
43. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 22.
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infrastructures could not support them.44 In the 1990s, the nation's failed
Economic Structural Adjustment Policy, its cash payments to pre-
independence war veterans, and its egregious military overspending on the
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo all contributed to the country's
economic decline. 4 5 Then, later that decade, the Mugabe government
formalized its support of the increasingly frequent and often violent
invasions of white-owned commercial farms, 46 which "rendered homeless
and jobless large numbers of farm workers. '4 7 As a result of economic
decline and subsequent mass unemployment, Zimbabweans turned to an
informal economy to support themselves, with the tacit approval and even
encouragement of the government.
4 8
Compared to other African nations facing similar rapid urbanization
crises, Zimbabwe's rate of slum occupancy has remained unusually low
until recent years.4 9 This is for two reasons: First, the nation's strictly
enforced building codes restricted the construction of slum settlements; and
second, areas surrounding cities consisted mainly of farms, which precluded
settlers from squatting on them. 50 Although the farm invasions offered
poor urban settlers new access to land near cities, many urban residents had
already come to rely on rentals of "backyard extensions. '5 1 Because the
Zimbabwean government was unable to keep pace with the housing
demand, the U.N. reports that leaders turned "a blind eye to these
developments," 52 thereby forcing local authorities to disregard strict
planning bylaws. 53 In May 2005, the Zimbabwean government changed its
position, suddenly enforcing these laws 54  through Operation
Murambatsvina and inflicting what is perhaps the most widely felt example
of President Mugabe's continuing campaign of oppression and violence.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 22-23; Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 3-4.
46. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 3-4.
47. Id. at 4.
48. See id. at 4-5 (detailing how the government has allowed informal traders to operate
without appropriate licenses and has overlooked the construction of illegal shelters in
response to housing shortages). For example, the Zimbabwe Parliament "allowed for the
development of non-residential activities in residential areas," sending "a clear signal to
local authorities of the government's desire to promote the informal economy in residential
areas." Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 23.
49. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 25.
50. See id. at 24-25 (indicating that in 2001 Zimbabwe's slums comprised only 3.4% of
the urban population, while in other "industrialized nations" the figure stood at
approximately 6.2%).
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 26. Furthermore, Tibaijuka noted in her report that by "2004, backyard
tenancy had become a dominant source of housing for low-income households living in
urban areas. In Mutare, for example, the mission was informed that there were 34,000
backyard extensions compared to 27,000 legally recognised and approved dwellings. In
Victoria Falls, they comprised 64% of the housing stock." Id.
53. See id. at 24-26.
54. See id. at 12.
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2. The Government's Justifications for Operation Murambatsvina
The government put forth a number of reasons for instigating the slum-
clearance campaign. The outbuildings and informal vendors were blamed
for creating eyesores and spoiling the beauty of cities; interfering with
traffic flows; encouraging activities such as illegal foreign-exchange trading
and commodity hoarding, which were blamed for undermining the
economy; posing a health hazard due to inadequate sanitation facilities; and
harboring criminals, prostitutes, and illegal aliens. 55  Nonetheless,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civic groups cite various
political justifications as the main spark for the operation. 56 In March 2005,
poor urban dwellers supported the opposition party in parliamentary
elections, suggesting that the operation could have been a punishment
meted out by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and an attempt to relocate opposition
supporters to rural areas where they could be more easily monitored.57
However, since the operation also affected ZANU-PF supporters, many
posit that it was either an attempt to quell urban unrest by dispersing the
population or an attempt to gain control over the informal markets for the
government's benefit. 58 Since the government did not issue an official
statement declaring the specific reasons for the operation, speculations on
motive remain just that;59 ultimately, all that is clear is that Murambatsvina
carried with it a devastating immediate impact.
3. Direct Effects of Operation Murambatsvina
Operation Murambatsvina directly affected a substantial proportion of
the Zimbabwean population. In its first three weeks, the campaign left
more than 700,000 people homeless or jobless60 and the U.N. received
55. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 16-17. Animosity toward
illegal aliens was particularly prevalent in Mutare, which is on the border of Mozambique,
where migrants were ordered to return to their home countries during the campaign. See
Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper: "Clear the Filth," Mass Evictions and Demolitions in
Zimbabwe 31-32 (2005) (providing interviews with immigrants who were displaced during
the operation).
56. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 17-21.
57. See id. at 17; see also interview with David Coltart, Member of Parliament,
Bulawayo S., in Bulawayo, Zimb. (Aug. 1, 2006). Mugabe's political party, Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has been in power in various forms
since he was elected in 1980. See Sokwanele Civil Action Support Group, The Main
Political Parties in Zimbabwe,
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/homepage/mainpoliticalparties.html (last visited Aug.
20, 2007).
58. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 19.
59. See id. at 17 (noting that there has "been no comprehensive policy statement from
the [g]overnment").
60. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 7. Approximately seventy percent of those affected
lived in Harare and its outskirts, with the remaining thirty percent of victims residing in such
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reports of police brutality, tens of thousands of arrests and detentions, 61 and
of residents being forced to dismantle their own homes and businesses,
including those who possessed the required building permits and complied
with all relevant laws.62 In addition, the government reported that during
these inaugural weeks, approximately 92,460 housing structures were
destroyed, directly affecting 133,534 households, 63 and 32,538 businesses
were demolished, directly eliminating the livelihoods of approximately
97,614 people. 64 Moreover, several NGOs reported deaths arising directly
from the operation, although these reports stand in the single digits and
remain unsubstantiated. 65 This section examines the immediate issues
raised by the implementation of Operation Murambatsvina, illustrating the
devastation wrought during the winter months of 2005.
a. Lack of Notice
In the run up to the operation, the government gave residents little or no
notice of their impending evictions. On May 19, 2005, Ms. Sekesai
Makwavarara, Chairperson of the Harare Commission, 66 delivered a speech
at Harare Town House describing the operation as a means of purging
illegal activity from city centers. 67 Then, on May 24 and 26, 2005, The
Herald, one of Zimbabwe's major newspapers, printed an official notice
urban areas as Bulawayo, Mutare, Kariba, Beitbridge, and Victoria Falls. See ActionAid Int'l
S. Africa P'ship Programme, The Impact of "Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order" in
Zimbabwe, at iii (2005).
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Furthermore, an estimated 40,000 people
were reportedly arrested during the operation's official five-week period for "alleged illegal
or criminal activities." Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 33.
62. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 12, 59.
63. See id. at 32. The U.N. report states that an average household consisted of
approximately four to six people. See id at 32 n.47.
64. See id. at 32.
65. See id. at 62-63, 62 n.130 (indicating that four people died at Porta Farm as a result
of Operation Murambatsvina but that none of the deaths had been confirmed); Zimb. Human
Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 10 (describing the alleged deaths of several victims of
Operation Murambatsvina).
66. Since Sekesai Makwavarara served as head of the Harare Commission, a body
appointed by the Mugabe government, her announcement of Murambatsvina and its
subsequent implementation are alleged not to be the result of a democratic process. See
Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 2.
67. Makwavarara announced:
This is a programme to enforce by-laws to stop all forms of illegal activities.
These violations of the by-laws are in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal
structures, touting/abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street-life/prostitution,
vandalism of property and infrastructure, stock theft, illegal cultivation, among
others [and] have led to the deterioration of standards thus negatively affecting the
image of the City.
Transcript of Speech by the Chairperson of the Harare Commission Cde Sekesai
Makwavarara on the Occasion of the Official Launch of "Operation Murambatsvina " at the
Town House on 19th May, 2005 at 12 Noon, Saturday Herald (Zimb.), May 28, 2005, at 5,
reprinted in Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 95.
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from the City of Harare, informing residents that all illegal structures
should be dismantled or registered with local authorities by June 20, 2005.68
Residents of other cities appear not to have received any warning at all.
69
Ultimately, the police and army forces charged with implementing the
operation completely disregarded the deadlines included in the newspaper
notice. In fact, in the weeks preceding its publication, the police had
already begun randomly rounding up informal traders and destroying their
vending stalls. 70 Then, in the days that followed the newspaper notice, a
"massive military style operation"71 kicked off in Harare, Bulawayo, and
Mutare, as well as in other urban areas throughout the country. 72 For
example, on June 8, in Killarney, a well-known settlement located just
outside of Bulawayo, police informed residents that they should remove
their belongings in order to prepare for demolition of their homes and
businesses. 73 Then, on June 12, police arrived at dawn, torching structures
and bulldozing long-standing residential communities. 74 The U.N. has
determined that the government's failure to provide adequate notice of the
program and the police's disregard of the official deadline contributed
considerably to the inability of evictees to find alternative housing and to
the destruction of their property.75
b. Lack of Housing and Employment Alternatives
The lack of notice further compounded the problems faced by those who
had no viable options for alternative housing or employment. 76 From the
start, the government ordered victims to return to their rural homes,
including those who had emigrated or fled as refugees from neighboring
nations and those who never or no longer had rural homes. 77 Additionally,
many of those who did have rural homes could not afford to travel to
them; 78 the government assisted in these relocation efforts by trucking the
displaced to rural areas, abandoning them in places where they had no
resources or contacts, 79 where food shortages were increasing in severity,
80
68. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 58, 96.
69. See id. at 58.
70. See id. at 87.
71. Id. at 12; see also Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 2.
72. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 12; see also Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra
note 34, at 6-7.
73. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 26.
74. Eighty-three percent of Killarney residents had no rural home to which they could
return. See id. at 26.
75. See id. at 58, 77-78.
76. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 10-11.
77. See Jeff Nicolai, Comment, Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity
Under the Rome Statute?, 21 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 813, 819 (2006).
78. See id.
79. See Solidarity Peace Trust, "Crime of Poverty": Murambatsvina Part I1 8 (2005).
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and where they were often rejected by tribal leaders for the "immorality of
[their] urban lifestyles." 81 By July 18, 2005, the U.N. estimated that, of the
total number directly affected, approximately 20% were living without any
shelter; another 20% had moved or were forced to move to rural areas; 30%
had found shelter with family or friends; and the final 30% had sought
refuge in churches and other temporary locations. 82 Those without family
or friends upon whom they could rely were forced to adapt to life in the
bush or in government-operated camps.83
Now, more than two years after the implementation of the operation,
these problems persist. In September 2006, Amnesty International reported
that many of the victims had found some sort of shelter since the operation,
but that others remained living in the open, 84 were contending with
overcrowded and filthy conditions, 85 or were sheltering in rooms intended
to be used as bathrooms. 86 In addition, as of August 2006, many of the
affected were still staying at a government-run internally displaced persons
camp in Harare, 87 which was notorious for its poor sanitation facilities and
the ill health of its residents. 88 And in May 2007, when Zimbabwean
80. See Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International's Concerns at the 56th Session of the
Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at 17, Al
Index IOR 41/060/2005, Oct. 1, 2005.
81. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 35 (quoting a confidential submission).
82. See id. at 34-35. The operation was even more brutal in that it took place during
winter, which in Zimbabwe can reach temperatures as low as eight degrees Celsius. See id. at
34.
83. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 819; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 3.
84. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 3.
85. See id. at 2.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 3. The camp just outside Harare, Hopley Farm, is one of several around
the country created by the government to serve as temporary accommodation for the
displaced during Murambatsvina. Essentially, when victims of the operation arrived, they
were dumped "on bare land without shelter or access to adequate water, food or sanitation."
Id. One church minister told of how those sheltering in Bulawayan churches were initially
lured away by the police to temporary camps with the promise that they were going to be
given land, recalling that as the days went by the police began to raid the churches and
forcibly remove the displaced to the camps during the night. He stated that at Helensvale, a
camp in outer Bulawayo, the first seventy displaced persons to arrive found a mere five tents
for shelter, a police tent, and an empty tank of water. In addition, they were forced to dig
their own latrine trenches. Confidential Interview with Bulawayan church minister, in
Bulawayo, Zimb. (Aug. 1, 2006).
88. Hopley Farm became home to thousands of displaced persons who had originally
lived at other camps, including Caledonia Farm and Porta Farm. One human rights
researcher described how difficult it was to gain access to the camp: Some journalists and
human rights advocates had been able to come through a back entrance with workers who
were returning home for the day, but the healthy color of their skin, their lack of open sores,
and the condition of their clothing marked them as outsiders. Confidential Interviews with
Harare human rights researcher, in Harare, Zimb. (June 2006); see also Video: Zimbabwe:
Secret Footage Reveals Desperate Plight of Homeless (Amnesty Int'l 2005), available at
http://news.amnesty.org/mavp/mediaclip.nsf/0/306F2EE60887486580257065006073BO
(showing squalid conditions at Hopley Farm).
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activists marked the second anniversary of the operation's inception, they
observed that whole families were now staying in "makeshift plastic
shack[s]," living "a life worse than they led in the concrete and brick
structures they were living in before the [O]peration."8 9 Unfortunately, due
to the preexisting housing shortage that was further exacerbated by
Murambatsvina, 90 few alternatives exist for those still suffering.
Murambatsvina also directly affected the livelihoods of tens of thousands
of Zimbabweans. 9 1 Due to a lack of formal employment in the years
preceding the operation, the informal sector had become the foundation of
the Zimbabwean economy.92 Not only did the government target the stalls
of these informal-economy street vendors, but it also eliminated housing
outbuildings, 93 which pensioners had rented out to lodgers in order to
supplement their meager incomes. 94  Roadside markets-although now
reemerging-were shut down, depriving rural residents of vital income and
eliminating a major source of business for the agricultural industry. 9 5 In
addition, the police seized, destroyed, or auctioned off the stocks of many
informal traders' shops, 96 dealing these vendors a further financial blow.
The destruction left gaps in both the formal and informal employment
sectors due to the large percentage of the population forced to relocate in
search of housing.9 7 Murambatsvina exacerbated what was already a record
unemployment rate 98 by eliminating much of the informal sector and
leaving many Zimbabweans entirely dependent on foreign and charitable
aid.99
c. Inadequate and Obstructed Distribution ofAid
While the justifications for the operation remain uncertain, it is clear that
the government planned its implementation poorly, providing no
89. Posting of Macdonald Lewanika to This Is Zimbabwe,
http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/573 (May 21, 2007, 1:20 p.m.).
90. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 1. Rents reportedly doubled and tripled in the
aftermath of the operation. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 36.
91. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 35-36; see also ActionAid Int'l S. Africa P'ship
Programme, supra note 60, at 14-19.
92. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 17, 24.
93. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 818-19. The term "outbuildings," in this case, refers
to shacks, built mainly from wood but also from concrete blocks, that were attached to
permanent housing structures. Some homes had four or more of these shacks added on to
the main building. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 25.
94. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 35-36. Without these sources of informal income,
many pensioners were forced to survive on US$2 per month. See id
95. See id. at 36.
96. See id. at 35, 63.
97. See id at 36.
98. See id. at 75; see also Wines, supra note 23; Zimbabwe 'Running Out of Wheat,'
BBC News, Mar. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4773876.stm (observing the
sharp increase in inflation rates over the past two years).
99. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 35.
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alternatives for the displaced either through national channels or aid
agencies. 100 Moreover, many churches declined to assist victims in the
immediate aftermath of the operation, fearing a governmental backlash.' 0'
As the crisis grew, at least in Mutare, one major church took a lead in
distributing aid, calling on smaller local churches to assist. 102
Subsequently, a black market for food, blankets, and other emergency
supplies grew out of the corruption and desperation of those working in the
local churches. 10 3 Soon after, in Mutare, the government took control of
the distribution of food and blankets, resulting in the outright politicization
of aid and leaving opposition supporters without basic necessities.10 4 In its
implementation of Murambatsvina, the Zimbabwean government failed to
provide adequate humanitarian assistance' 05 and also blocked such aid from
being supplied by other bodies.
4. Long-Term Implications of Operation Murambatsvina
Beyond the direct disruption to the employment and housing sectors,
Operation Murambatsvina affected the lives of another 2.4 million
Zimbabwe residents.' 0 6 This section highlights some of the many ways the
operation's effects have persisted, emphasizing the lack of food security,
100. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 21.
101. See Confidential Interview with a representative of the Zimbabwean Anglican
Diocese, in Mutare, Zimb. (July 6, 2006). The Anglican Diocese was one of the only church
groups to respond immediately to the emergency situation, as most churches and aid groups
were afraid to act out of fear of government retribution against them, including the
possibility of interference with sources of funding. Id. The government's Non-governmental
Organizations Bill, which has not yet been enacted but serves as a constant threat to all aid
organizations operating in Zimbabwe, denies local groups access to foreign funding if they
are involved with political issues. See Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe's Non-
Governmental Organizations Bill: Out of Sync with SADC Standards and Threat to Civil
Society Groups 4 (2004); see also Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 13-
14 (describing how the government blocked the U.N. from providing aid during the
operation and how such organizations were forced to operate "clandestinely"). Moreover, in
April 2007, the government reportedly "revoke[d] the legal basis for all nongovernmental
organizations to operate inside the country, arguing that some of the groups have provided
cover for Western governments seeking to overthrow" the president. Michael Wines,
Zimbabwe: Aid Groups'Status Revoked, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 2007, at A6.
102. See Confidential Interview with a representative of the Zimbabwean Anglican
Diocese, supra note 101.
103. See id. The Chicago Tribune reported in November 2005 that "a nephew of
Mugabe's was arrested... for reselling subsidized flour in Zambia, where it fetched a higher
price." Paul Salopek, On Road to Economic Meltdown: Insular Zimbabwe Is Fast Becoming
Africa's North Korea, Chi. Trib., Nov. 6, 2005, § 1, at 4.
104. See Confidential Interview with a representative of the Zimbabwean Anglican
Diocese, supra note 101. In addition, the government only made matters worse when in July
2005 it forced the U.N. to condemn 900 tons of food donated by the United States, claiming
that it "look[ed] too green after cooking." In fact, the food was simply "overfortified with
nutrients." Salopek, supra note 103.
105. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 60-61, 71, 74.
106. See id. at 7.
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increased exposure to disease, disruption of the education system, and
further negative impacts on the faltering Zimbabwean economy.
a. Exacerbation of Food Insecurity
At the inception of the operation, Zimbabwe was already facing severe
food shortages,' 0 7 and conditions only worsened as the destruction swept
through its cities. Residents were rendered jobless, without any source of
income to obtain food, and the informal sector, which sustained many
residents, was left in chaos.108  The lack of foreign currency in the
Zimbabwean federal reserves and the country's inability to access any
credit to import food stocks, as well as a reported drought, placed
Zimbabwe on the brink of famine during the 2005 to 2006 season. 10 9 While
food stocks appeared to have increased slightly in 2006, the U.N. estimated
that approximately seventeen percent of the rural population (1.4 million
people), including those still mobile after the operation, would be unable to
provide themselves with adequate food supplies for the period of December
2006 through March 2007.110 Furthermore, continued rising inflation and
unemployment rates mean that Zimbabweans' lack of food security will not
be resolved going forward. I I
b. Increased Exposure to Disease and Illness
Operation Murambatsvina also exposed hundreds of thousands of
Zimbabweans to disease and illness as a result of disrupted health care and
107. See id. at 47.
108. See id. at 38.
109. See id. at 47.
110. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Consolidated Appeals
Process, Zimbabwe: 2007, at 25 (2006); see also Jeff Koinange, Living Off Rats to Survive
in Zimbabwe, CNN.com, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/12/19/koinange.zimbabwe/ (describing the
practice of eating field rats to cope with increasingly severe food shortages). In August
2007, the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) reported that "an estimated 3.3 million
[Zimbabweans would] need assistance during the peak hunger period between November
and March" of the 2007 to 2008 season. UN in Food Aid Plea for Zimbabwe, BBC News,
Aug. 1, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6926651.stm. WFP further declared that,
during this peak period, Zimbabweans will be "forced to adopt risky survival measures,
including eating potentially poisonous wild foods, selling their remaining household assets,
exchanging sex for food and crossing illegally into South Africa." Id.
111. Operation Murambatsvina has been described as a "Draconian government slum-
clearing campaign" that has resulted in reports of unemployed market women turning to
prostitution to generate income, families eating out of garbage dumps, and a climate of fear
in which both public figures and the operation's now-homeless victims assume that they are
being spied upon by President Mugabe's secret police force. Salopek, supra note 103. In
reporting on the December 2006 arrest of 16,000 Zimbabwean miners, the BBC noted
Zimbabwe's struggles with "chronic unemployment" and "the world's lowest life
expectancy and highest inflation rate." Zimbabwe Holds 16,000 over Mining, BBC News,
Dec. 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/621443 l.stm.
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a lack of sanitation facilities and clean water.1 12 In the weeks immediately
following the operation, victims were at risk of contracting dysentery,
cholera, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and diarrhea, either due to the
overcrowded conditions at the camps or as a result of life without shelter at
all.11 3 During her visit, the U.N. Special Envoy observed displaced persons
collecting water from rivers and shallow wells and using untreated areas for
sanitation purposes."14  As of August 2006, this situation had barely
improved, with most camp residents still living in shelters made of plastic
sheeting; at that time, the lack of water and sanitation facilities remained a
major concern. 115 In addition, many of the displaced reported that the
condition of chronically ill members of their families worsened both during
and after the operation. 116 As early as July 2005, the U.N. had received
reports of disruption to health care, indicating that women who lost access
to reproductive services had no choice but to give birth in the open and that
many HIV/AIDS patients had lost access to antiretroviral drugs and home-
based care. 117 Aggravating concerns over disrupted health-care services,
the displacement also increased the vulnerability of women, with
overcrowding and homelessness leading to dangerous sexual practices, such
as prostitution, and increased sex-related violence, 118 heightening women's
chances of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. While the immediate
impact of the disruption of the health-care delivery system is clear, the
effects on the nation in the years to come remain to be seen.
c. Disruption of Education
Murambatsvina interrupted the delivery of education, the success of
which is often used as a proxy for measuring the vulnerability of
children. 119 The operation occurred during the middle of the school year,120
112. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 37-38 (discussing the increased risk of exposure to
waterbome diseases in the immediate aftermath of Murambatsvina); see also id. at 40
(describing the increased risk of HIV infection due to vulnerability caused by
Murambatsvina).
113. Seeid. at 37-38.
114. See id.
115. See Amnesty Int'l & Zimb. Lawyers for Human Rights, Zimbabwe: Shattered
Lives-The Case of Porta Farm, at 17, Al Index AFR 46/004/2006, Mar. 31, 2006
(describing the plight of the 6000 to 10,000 residents of Porta Farm who were forcibly
evicted to Caledonia Farm and then to Hopley Farm, from which aid agencies and the U.N.
were subsequently denied access); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 4-5.
116. See ActionAid Int'l S. Africa P'ship Programme, supra note 60, at 21.
117. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 39. The U.N. estimates that approximately 79,500
HIV/AIDS patients over the age of fifteen were displaced in the first few weeks of the
operation. See id
118. See id In June 2005, the U.N. reported that since May sales of male condoms had
dropped by more than 20% and female condoms by 40%. See id. at 40-41.
119. See ActionAid Int'l S. Africa P'ship Programme, supra note 60, at 13.
120. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 41.
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and as of August 2005 dropout rates had increased dramatically,, 2 1 most
likely because of displacement, a lack of transportation, and an inability to
pay bus fares and other school fees. 122 In fact, children who were moved to
certain government-run camps, also referred to as transit camps, appeared to
have no schools to attend at all. 12 3 Moreover, in the wake of the operation,
teachers were displaced, several schools closed, and school heads turned
students away due to overcrowding and an uncertainty about student
transfer rules. 124 Again, it remains to be seen whether the Zimbabwean
education system will rebound from this massive disruption.
d. Disruption of the Zimbabwean Economy
While it is clear that Operation Murambatsvina had a deep impact on the
Zimbabwean economy, it is difficult to disentangle its effects from what
was already a failing system. The direct economic cost of the operation to
Zimbabwe has been estimated at approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
the country's gross domestic product, which is the equivalent of US$700
million. 125 The elimination of such a substantial proportion of an economy
that produces at the rate of US$4 billion per year undoubtedly carries
enormous long-term effects for the formal economy.126 Furthermore, on a
micro-level, many victims lost their only assets, which consisted of their
homes and vending stalls, including the materials they used to build them,
and their shop stocks. 127 While the economy was in decline prior to the
campaign, Murambatsvina exacerbated the situation for individuals and the
nation as a whole.
In conclusion, Operation Murambatsvina carried serious humanitarian
consequences for Zimbabweans both immediately and in the long run. Not
only did victims lose their homes and jobs but, as of this writing, they
continue to suffer under similar, if not worse, adverse conditions. The next
section examines the government's response to this humanitarian crisis in
the weeks and months after Murambatsvina.
121. ActionAid reported that 22% of the 23,511 households it surveyed indicated that
their children were no longer attending school. In addition, Harare, Mutare, and Bulawayo
reported a 20% increase in dropout figures, while children of female-headed households
appeared more likely to drop out than those in male-headed households. See ActionAid Int'l
S. Africa P'ship Programme, supra note 60, at 14.
122. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 41-42.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34, at 15.
126. See id
127. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 35; Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, supra note 34,
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
B. Operation Garikai
Five weeks after Murambatsvina began, the government announced that
the program had been completed and that Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle
would replace it. 128 Officially conceived by the Zimbabwean government
as a means of recognizing the dignity and hopes of Murambatsvina's
victims, 129 Garikai may also be framed in other ways: as a belated response
to the overwhelming humanitarian disaster the government created, as a
reaction to objections to Murambatsvina from nations such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, 130 or as a preemptive measure to stave off
further international condemnation in response to the U.N.'s impending
report. 131 The new campaign aspired to construct thousands of houses,
business facilities, and a sorely lacking infrastructure throughout the
country all by August 2005.132 Vice President Msika hosted the official
launch ceremony for Garikai, which the U.N. Special Envoy attended
during her two-week mission to the devastated nation. 133 In addition, the
government announced that ZW$3 trillion had been budgeted for new
homes; 134 however, no mention of this expenditure was made in the 2005
budget.135
Almost immediately, the U.N. expressed doubts about the government's
ability to implement Garikai.' 36 In view of Zimbabweans' humanitarian
needs, the official U.N. report stated that Garikai did "not appear to have
accounted for the immediate shelter needs of people who ha[d] been
rendered homeless at the onset of winter." 137  Moreover, the Special
Envoy's report pointed out that just the first phase of the operation would
128. See Zimb. Human Rights NGO Forum, The Aftermath of a Disastrous Venture: A
Follow-Up Report on "Operation Murambatsvina" 15 (2005).
129. See Gov't of Zimb., supra note 35, at 7.
130. See Andrew Meldrum, Mugabe Feels the Pinch, Guardian Unlimited, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,, 1564611,00.html (highlighting the
international criticism Mugabe has faced). In fact, the Zimbabwean government has
"acknowledged that Murambatsvina was carried out without sufficient safety nets to take
care of the victims" and was "somewhat embarrassed by the international outcry." Int'l
Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. See Gov't of Zimb., supra note 35, at 20. International nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), including International Crisis Group, have speculated that Operation
Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle was conceived in response to international criticism and "probably to
pre-empt the report that Tibaijuka was preparing for the U.N." Int'l Crisis Group, supra note
8, at 7.
132. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 47-48; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 7-9.
133. In his speech, Vice President Msika announced that Zimbabwe was "destroying in
order to build." Lester Holloway, Zimbabwe-The Other Half of the Story, Blink, June 30,
2005, http://www.blink.org.uk/print.asp?key=7891.
134. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 47. With spiraling inflation, the value of this money
dramatically depreciated almost immediately, if it was earmarked at all. See Solidarity Peace
Trust, supra note 79, at 5 (describing the effect of inflation on Garikai funds).
135. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 47-48.
136. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 822.
137. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 49.
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cost approximately US$35 to $40 million, which demanded foreign
currency that would not only strain other sectors but would also drain the
nation's remaining currency reserves. 138 Finally, the report noted that in
recent years the government had allocated less than 5000 plots of land to its
constituents per year, a number dramatically disproportionate to the 4900 it
announced it would attempt to allocate within a target time frame of less
than two months. 139
Early on, a number of NGOs, including Amnesty International, 140
Human Rights Watch, 14 1 and Solidarity Peace Trust, which described the
program as mere "window dressing,"' 142 reported that Garikai was failing to
address the needs of Murambatsvina's victims. By the government's own
estimates, 92,460 homes were destroyed during the first five weeks of the
operation, yet it announced a rebuilding target of just 15,825.143 By May of
2006, officials declared that only 3325 homes had been rebuilt, with
Amnesty International reporting that the majority of the homes were
incomplete, lacking windows, doors, floors, roofs, and sanitation and water
facilities. 144 Furthermore, many of those homes were of substandard
construction, with twenty Garikai homes allegedly collapsing after a rainfall
in Chinoyi in November 2005 and others built on bedrock, where sewerage
pipes could not be laid. 145 Regardless of quality, construction of homes in
most areas remains at a standstill due to the government's failure to pay
contractors. 1
46
The government itself has admitted that the allocation of the newly built
homes has been politicized and that victims have not benefited. Local
Government Minister Ignatius Chombo has publicly stated that government
officials used the program for their own benefit, allocating homes to
138. Seeid. at48.
139. See id.
140. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 7-11.
141. See Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe: Evicted and Forsaken, Internally Displaced
Persons in the Aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina 2 (2005).
142. Solidarity Peace Trust, supra note 79, at 6.
143. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1, at 11.
144. See id. at 11-12. In Hobehouse, a suburb of Mutare, most Garikai homes, which
appear to be less than three meters long and wide, have been built without windows, doors,
indoor plumbing, or toilet facilities. Various interviewees reported that the displaced victims
of the operation would never benefit from these constructions for a number of reasons. First,
there simply are not enough homes to go around. Second, homes were mainly being
distributed to active ZANU-PF party members and their families, who have identification
cards to prove their membership. Finally, anyone who wishes to take advantage of the
program is required to pay a fee of ZW$6,000,000 (as of July 2006) to the government and
make monthly payments thereafter; beneficiaries are required to provide their own windows
and doors and install their own plumbing and electricity, all at their own cost. Confidential
Interviews with victims of Operation Murambatsvina, in Mutare and Bulawayo, Zimb.
(July-August 2006).
145. See Solidarity Peace Trust, supra note 7, at 28.
146. See id.
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themselves, family members, and friends. 147 Member of Parliament David
Coltart (of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party)
pointed out that at Cowdry Park, a targeted area near Bulawayo, one need
only look at the clotheslines of the newly built homes to see the uniforms of
government soldiers drying in the sun. 148 In addition to overcoming such
political hurdles, persons wishing to acquire Garikai homes must pay large
deposits and make substantial monthly payments, 149 requirements that are
practically impossible for the unemployed to meet. As a result of the
financial barriers to ownership and the pervasive corruption at all levels of
the allocation process, few of Murambatsvina's victims have benefited from
Garikai's rehousing plan, 150 and the question of what is to be done still
remains.
C. Possible U.N. Responses to Operations Murambatsvina and Garikai
At the end of the Cold War, the international approach to human rights
abuses perpetrated by sovereign nations against their own citizens
shifted. 151 Previously, the U.N. had only marginally addressed such issues,
but in the early 1990s, via a Security Council resolution, the U.N. first
directly included human rights as part of the process of peace building
within a country. 152 Since then, the U.N. has made great progress 153 in
147. See id. at 32-35 (discussing the corrupt allocation of Garikai homes).
148. See Interview with David Coltart, supra note 57.
149. See Solidarity Peace Trust, supra note 7, at 29 (describing the process of acquiring a
home in Bulawayo, which involves a wait list, an initial lump-sum payment, further monthly
payments, and payments to the local municipal services provider for services that may or
may not exist).
150. See generally Amnesty Int'l, Zimbabwe: Housing Policy Built on a Foundation of
Failures and Lies, Al Index AFR 46/015/2006, Sept. 8, 2006.
151. See Joanna Weschler, Human Rights, in The U.N. Security Council: From the Cold
War to the 21st Century 55, 55 (David M. Malone ed., 2004). The communist bloc
supported the post-Westphalian view of sovereignty, which posited that human rights
concerns went beyond the mandate of the U.N., as they did not involve relations between
nation states but rather within nation states. See id. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter may be
interpreted as a defense of this thesis: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
152. See Weschler, supra note 151, at 56. Security Council Resolution 693 established a
U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador for purposes of monitoring and reporting on human
rights violations. See S.C. Res. 693, para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/693 (May 20, 1991).
153. For example, in 1993 the U.N. Security Council established the Ad Hoc Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia via Resolution 827, and in 1994 it established a tribunal
for Rwanda. See Weschler, supra note 151, at 59-60; see also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). In
addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) established a
permanent criminal court to address such human rights violations as genocide and crimes
against humanity. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (17 July 1998).
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recognizing the observance of international human rights norms as integral
to the creation of "conditions of stability and well-being,"' 154 the mandate it
sets for itself in the U.N. Charter. In approaching a situation of internal
human rights abuses, such as in Zimbabwe, the U.N. now has a number of
tools at its disposal.
1. Diplomacy and Negotiation
First, the U.N can engage the perpetrators of such abuses in diplomatic
negotiations in an attempt to end the offending behavior. The U.N. may
rely on its own representatives or on another government to communicate
with officials responsible for or involved in the conflict in order to coerce or
negotiate a compromise or resolution. 155  Referred to as "track-one
diplomacy,"' 156 these techniques allow the U.N. to engage offending actors
in direct negotiation, to support other nations' efforts at negotiation, or to
act as mediators to the conflict. 157
With respect to Zimbabwe, the U.N. and the African Union have been
relying on South African President Thabo Mbeki to initiate and lead
negotiations with President Mugabe in order to find a resolution to
Zimbabwe's current economic and political crisis. 158 Referring to his
efforts as "quiet diplomacy," the media and the international community
largely agree that President Mbeki's efforts have thus far failed, 159 although
154. U.N. Charter art. 55.
155. See Susan Allen Nan, What Is Track-One Diplomacy?, Beyond Intractability.org,
June 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/trackl 
_diplomacy/.
156. Id. Nan differentiates between track-one diplomacy, which refers to official
diplomatic communications and encompasses most of the U.N.'s work, and track-two
diplomacy, which involves unofficial communications from advocates, mediators, and
NGOs, among other groups. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Mbeki to Tackle Zimbabwe Crisis, BBC News, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6505391.stm; Interview with South African President
Thabo Mbeki (BBC World Service broadcast May 24, 2006), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/newshour/news/story/2006/05/060525-mbe
ki.shtml. Since his efforts to mediate talks between the two rival Zimbabwean political
factions began earlier this year, in anticipation of the upcoming 2008 presidential elections,
Mbeki has remained quiet publicly. See Zimbabwe Crisis Talks Adjourned, BBC News,
June 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6223708.stm ("Mr Mbeki was asked by
fellow southern African leaders to mediate in an effort to resolve Zimbabwe's political and
economic crisis."). After a recent Southern African Development Community (SADC)
meeting, at which the results of Mbeki's negotiations were rumored to have been discussed,
"the US state department said Mr Mugabe's government had not shown any commitment to
a democratic, prosperous Zimbabwe" and Mbeki issued no statement on his progress. See No
Pressure on Mugabe from Summit, BBC News, Aug. 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6952486.stm.
159. See Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's Man of Two Faces, Economist, Jan. 20, 2005, at
26, 27; Zimbabwe: The Hogwash of Quiet Diplomacy, Economist, Apr. 4, 2007, at 44; see
also Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 13-14; Blessing Zulu, South Africa Hands Off
Zimbabwe Portfolio to Regional Grouping, Voice of America, Nov. 9, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-11/2006-11-09-voa4l .cfm.
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a recent summit of fourteen African nations declared that Mbeki would
embark on a more formal course of discussions. 160 South Africa's decision
to pursue such nonaggressive tactics seems to rest on several rationales: the
goal of preserving the "force-based"161 ruling party, ZANU-PF, as a means
of preventing further civil conflict; the widely held view of President
Mugabe as a hero of African liberation and the resistance to outside
interference with his legacy; and the belief that Zimbabweans must rely
only on themselves rather than on outsiders to resolve the political
conflict. 162 These rationales suggest that even the humanitarian crisis
precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina and Mugabe's leadership will not
affect South Africa's relations with Zimbabwe. 163
2. International Criminal Prosecution
Depending on the level of abuse, the U.N. may also choose to prosecute
those responsible for human rights abuses under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).164 For the court to exercise jurisdiction
over a state or its citizens, the state must have signed and ratified the
statute. 165 Alternatively, either another state or the Security Council can
refer a situation that threatens international peace and security in a non-
ratifying state to the court's prosecutor under article 13(b). 166 On July 18,
1998, Zimbabwe signed the treaty; however, the government has yet to
ratify it.167 Therefore, prosecution of Zimbabwe and its nationals would
require a referral.
The court's power to prosecute is further limited in a number of ways.
First, jurisdiction extends only to the gravest crimes, including genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression,
168 all of
160. See Mbeki to Tackle Zimbabwe Crisis, supra note 158. The results of these
negotiations, which included representatives from both the ruling party and the opposition,
with Mbeki leading, were presented to the African Union in August 2007. See Patience
Rusere, US Voices Skepticism on South African-Mediated Zimbabwe Crisis Talks, Voice of
America, June 19, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2007-06-19-voa67.cfm;
see also supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 13.
162. See id. at 14; see also Interview with South African President Thabo Mbeki, supra
note 158.
163. See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 13.
164. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153.
165. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 828-29.
166. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153, art. 13(b); see
also Philippe Kirsch, John T. Holmes & Mora Johnson, International Tribunals and Courts,
in The U.N. Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, supra note 151, at
281, 288-89; Nicolai, supra note 77, at 834-36 (arguing that the Security Council should
refer President Mugabe to the ICC's prosecutor).
167. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Participants,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIlIItreaty 11.asp
(last visited Aug. 20, 2007) (listing all countries that have signed and/or ratified the Rome
Statute).
168. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153, art. 5.
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which the court defines narrowly in favor of the accused. 169 In addition,
since the court is a "court of last resort," 170 a state may object to its referral
by offering a "complementarity challenge,"' 17 1 proving that it has genuinely
attempted to investigate or prosecute the situation itself. 172 Finally, the
court may only act if the situation involves a "widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population" and where the perpetrator had
knowledge of the attack. 173
3. Action Under U.N. Charter Chapter VII
Under the U.N. Charter, the U.N. can authorize either the use of military
force to halt abuses or impose economic, travel, trade, and diplomatic
sanctions to coerce policy change. 174 The charter charges the Security
Council with the mandate of maintaining international peace and
security, 175 and, therefore, the Security Council is responsible for deciding
when the use of force or the imposition of sanctions is appropriate against
states, groups, or individuals. While the General Assembly frequently
releases declarations on issues related to the maintenance of peace and
security, 176 the Security Council is the only branch of the U.N. that has the
power to issue legally binding 177 resolutions on member states. For this
reason, the Security Council is seen as the primary body for enforcing
international human rights norms and treaties. 
178
Chapter VII offers the responses available to the Security Council when
it encounters any international "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
169. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 829.
170. International Criminal Court: About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html
(last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
171. Kirsch, Holmes & Johnson, supra note 166, at 288.
172. See id. at 288-89.
173. Nicolai, supra note 77, at 838 n.150 (citing Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l
Criminal Court, Report Addendum: Part I1, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes,
art. 7(1)(d)(5), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000)).
174. See U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42.
175. See U.N. Charter art. 23.
176. For example, during its sixtieth session, the General Assembly issued resolutions on
such issues as the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse in future U.N. peacekeeping
missions, the U.N.'s global counterterrorism strategy, and the prevention of armed conflict.
See G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006); G.A. Res. 60/289, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/60/289 (Sept. 18, 2006); G.A. Res. 60/284, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/284 (Sept. 15,
2006).
177. See article 25 of the U.N. Charter, which indicates member states' legal obligation to
"accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter." U.N. Charter art. 25. See also Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and
International Law, in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century,
supra note 151, at 591, 601 (discussing the Security Council's role as an international human
rights enforcement body).
178. See Ratner, supra note 177, at 601-02 (explaining that the Security Council's
mandate extends beyond ensuring compliance with its own resolutions under article 25 to the
enforcement of other binding international law, including human rights treaties and norms).
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and acts of aggression." 179 Once the Security Council determines that such
a threat exists, it decides what measures should be taken "to maintain or
restore international peace and security."' 80 Article 41 governs the Security
Council's use of economic sanctions, and article 42 controls the use of
military force. 18 1  The language of article 41 is broad, covering all
"measures not involving the use of armed force," including "complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations." 182 Article 42 implies that recourse to military force is
to be used as a last resort, only when measures under article 41 "would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate."' 183 Although reliance on
either of these articles technically requires the finding of a "threat to the
peace,"' 184 a brief review of recent Security Council resolutions reveals that
this language is easily satisfied.' 85 In the past, the U.N. has determined that
certain instances of racism, genocide, starvation, and "massive violations of
human rights" have all constituted threats to the peace. 186
Furthermore, over the past several years, the U.N. has moved toward a
more liberal definition of a threat to the peace through the emergence of the
"responsibility to protect" doctrine. 187  Introduced in a report by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001,188
the doctrine was officially adopted by the U.N. in the Secretary-General's
2004 High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change. 189
179. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
180. U.N. Charter art. 39.
181. See U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42.
182. U.N. Charter art. 41.
183. U.N. Charter art. 42.
184. U.N. Charter art. 39.
185. For example, as far back as 1977, the Security Council interpreted what were
essentially internal human rights violations as satisfying the threat to the peace language.
Resolution 418, which called for sanctions against South Africa in response to its apartheid
program, found that the "policies and acts of the South African Government [were] fraught
with danger to international peace and security," and cited the South African "military build-
up" and its position on the "threshold of producing nuclear weapons" to satisfy the language.
S.C. Res. 418, paras. 3, 6, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977). With the passage of
time, the threat to the peace requirement appears to have become a technicality in the
Security Council's advocacy of chapter VII resolutions. For example, Resolution 733
against Somalia only mentions the consequences to regional stability and rather focuses on
the "heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in
the country." S.C. Res. 733, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992).
186. Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed
Attacks 43 (2002).
187. See Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect 11-12 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report], available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, Sec'y-Gen.'s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 65-66 (2004)
[hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
188. ICISS Report, supra note 187.
189. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 187.
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Shifting the discussion from intervention in a sovereign state's internal
affairs, either through military force or sanctions, the U.N. is now
attempting to confront gross violations of human rights through the
paradigm of a responsibility to protect the safety and lives of all human
beings. 190 The doctrine transforms the U.N. from an organization confined
to focusing on relationships between states into one that is working to
uphold its role as promoter of the "dignity and worth of the human
person."' 191 With this shift comes a new construction of the definition of
sovereignty, recasting it from one that shapes the nation as fortress to one
that shapes the nation as obligated by a duty to its citizens. Not only does
this reconstruction encourage governmental accountability for internal
human rights violations, but it also implies that nations are responsible to
their citizens and to the world through the U.N. for the protection of those
citizens and the promotion of their development. 192 Practically speaking,
this doctrine broadens the Security Council's mandate and grants it greater
authority when assessing whether or not to impose sanctions or military
force.
When advocating for the use of force or sanctions under chapter VII, the
Security Council is beholden to political will. The council is composed of
fifteen members-ten rotating positions and five permanent positions. 193
The adoption of any resolution requires the affirmative vote of nine
members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. 194
The five permanent members are China, the United Kingdom, France, the
Russian Federation, and the United States, and their veto power grants them
the ability to strike down actions against any nation in their own self
interests, regardless of human rights violations in that nation. 195
190. See ICISS Report, supra note 187, at 13 (explaining the move from "sovereignty as
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties").
191. U.N. Charter pmbl.
192. See ICISS Report, supra note 187, at 13 (suggesting that states may now be held
responsible for "the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of
their welfare," that states may be responsible to their "citizens internally and to the
international community through the UN," and that state officials are "accountable for their
acts of commission and omission").
193. See Membership of the Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last
visited Aug. 20, 2007).
194. See U.N. Charter art. 27.
195. See generally Open-Ended Working Group, Report on the Question of Equitable
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other
Matters Related to the Security Council General Assembly, Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/58/47
(2004) (discussing the use of the permanent members' veto and potential Security Council
reforms). Since 1946, the Security Council's inaugural year, the veto has been used a total
of 259 times. See Security Council: Patterns in the Use of the Veto, Global Policy Forum,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007). The
Russian Federation leads the list with 123 vetoes, while the United States has tallied eighty-
two. Id. Following are the United Kingdom at thirty-two, France at eighteen, and China at
five. Id. However, over the past twenty years, the United States has exercised its veto power
only thirty-six times, the United Kingdom eight times, the Russian Federation and France
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a. Military Action Under Chapter VII
Where all other methods of negotiation and inducement fail, article 42
authorizes the Security Council to intervene with military force, 196 while
article 25197 requires member states to uphold any resolution mandating the
use of force. 19 8 When the council recognizes a threat to the peace that
requires the use of military action, it generally authorizes force by U.N.
member states, rather than leading a campaign itself.199 The U.N. may rely
on the use of military force only as a last resort.2 00 Finally, any chapter VII
authorization of force is subject to the customary law doctrine of
proportionality, which requires that force be proportionate to the aggression
that triggered it.20 1
The Security Council has authorized its member states to use force
against other nations or groups in a wide variety of situations:20 2 The
United States has led coalitions of armed forces in Korea (1950), Iraq-
Kuwait (1990), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1994); France has led armed
forces in Rwanda (1994); Italy has led in Albania (1997); and Australia has
led in East Timor (1999).203 The Security Council has also authorized the
"limited use of force by states 20 4 to enforce sanctions, among other
initiatives. However, the Security Council may not always be successful in
authorizing the use of armed force in an intervention for two reasons. First,
the U.N. relies on its member states to supply the necessary troops. 20 5
States may be unwilling to commit their resources for a variety of reasons,
and this may impede the Security Council's attempts at intervening in a
crisis, as was the case in Rwanda in 1994.206 Second, the Security Council
faces the threat of a veto from each of the five permanent member states,0 7
even where there is an "overwhelming case" for the use of force. For
example, the Security Council was unable to act in East Pakistan (1971),
Kurdish Iraq (1991), and Kosovo (1999).208
three times each, and China twice. Id. Moreover, few vetoes have been cast in order to
block resolutions that dealt with pressing humanitarian issues. Id.
196. U.N. Charter art. 42.
197. U.N. Charter art. 25. "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id.
198. See Franck, supra note 186, at 21.
199. See Adam Roberts, The Use of Force, in The UN Security Council: From the Cold
War to the 21st Century, supra note 151, at 133, 136.
200. See supra text accompanying note 183.
201. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J.
Int'l L. 391, 391 (1993) (discussing the doctrine of proportionality regarding the use of force
as a tool of humanitarian intervention and a method of self-defense).
202. See Roberts, supra note 199, at 136.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 136, 138; see also U.N. Charter art. 43.
206. See Roberts, supra note 199, at 138.
207. See supra text accompanying note 195.
208. Roberts, supra note 199, at 139.
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b. Sanctions Under Chapter VII
Under chapter VII, the U.N. may also opt to impose sanctions against an
offending nation or individuals. The U.N. has imposed sanctions
approximately twenty times since its founding, with just two of these
instances occurring during the first forty-five years of the institution's
existence. 209  In the 1990s, demonstrating an increasing reliance on
sanctions as a coercive tool,2 10 the U.N. imposed sanctions against Iraq
(1990), the former Yugoslavia (1991, 1992, and 1998), Libya (1992),
Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), parts of Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993),
parts of Angola (1993, 1997, and 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996),
Sierra Leone (1997), and Afghanistan (1999).21 1
Sanctions are based on several basic principles. First, any sanctions
program consists of a "sender," or the country or group imposing sanctions,
and a "target," the offending nation. 2 12 Second, they attempt to deny
nations the benefits of being members of a global community. Essentially,
sanctions control the flow of goods, services, money, 2 13 or other benefits
into and out of a given nation in an effort to coerce that nation into
complying with or ceasing specific behaviors. Finally, economic sanctions
may serve as a way to prepare the public for the eventual use of military
action 2 14 or to offer a less costly, and therefore more feasible, alternative to
military action. 2 15
A range of behaviors and policies of targeted countries has triggered
U.N. sanctions. The first U.N. sanctions program was imposed on Southern
Rhodesia in 1965, lasting until 1979, over concerns about continued
209. See generally U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committees,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2007) (offering a historical overview
of Security Council-sponsored sanctions programs). The target nations in these two
instances were Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. See id.
210. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade 1 (2000). For
example, after the Security Council passed Resolution 687 authorizing sanctions against Iraq
in 1991, it then proceeded to impose sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Libya, Liberia, Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) all within a span of two years. See id.
211. See id. at 1-2.
212. See Amy Howlett, Note, Getting "Smart": Crafting Economic Sanctions That
Respect All Human Rights, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1199, 1211 (2004).
213. See Andrew K. Fishman, Comment, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The Use of
Economic Sanctions and Threats to International Peace and Security, 13 Emory Int'l L.
Rev. 687, 691 (1999) (noting that sanctions inflict hardship on a state in an attempt to coerce
it into changing its approach).
214. For example, the imposition of economic sanctions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti
preceded military intervention. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 6 (stating that
some view sanctions as simply an attempt to prepare the public for the impending use of
force).
215. See, e.g., id. (discussing sanctions as an alternative to inaction or military force); see
also Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S.
Legal Regime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1162, 1169 (1987).
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rebellion under Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 216
During the 1990s, the U.N. used sanctions "to reverse territorial aggression,
restore democratically elected leaders, promote human rights, deter and
punish terrorism, and promote disarmament. ' 217  Recently the U.N.
imposed a range of targeted sanctions on North Korea 218 and Iran 219 in
response to the development of both nations' nuclear programs. Over the
past fifty years, the Security Council has interpreted a variety of crises in a
way that satisfies the threat to the peace language required in article 39.220
The U.N. most frequently imposes sanctions in response to loss of life
due to violence; 221 however, the language of sanctions resolutions remains
fairly broad, encompassing a host of issues. For example, in Haiti, from
1993 to 1994 under Resolution 841, the Security Council imposed sanctions
in response to the coup against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 222 The
resolution discussed the ongoing humanitarian crisis, "including mass
displacements of population" and "a climate of fear of persecution and
economic dislocation which could increase the number of Haitians seeking
refuge in neighbouring Member States," and called for a "reversal of [the]
situation ... to prevent its negative repercussions on the region. ' 223 The
Security Council resolution against Afghanistan cited "continuing
violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights,
particularly discrimination against women and girls. 224  And, in
sanctioning the former Yugoslavia for the first time, the Security Council
relied upon "the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular
216. See S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966); see also S.C. Res. 460,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/460 (Dec. 21, 1979).
217. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 2.
218. See S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
219. See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
220. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
221. For examples, see Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, and the
former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res. 1298, paras. 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (May 17, 2000)
(citing "the continuation of fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia... the loss of human life
resulting from the fighting, and.., the negative impact the diversion of resources to the
conflict continues to have on efforts to address the ongoing humanitarian food crisis in the
region"); S.C. Res. 1132, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (citing "continued
violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997, the
deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for neighbouring
countries"); S.C. Res. 918, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994) (citing "ongoing
violence in Rwanda... the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in
Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and
continue operating therein"); S.C. Res. 733, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992)
(citing "the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life
and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and... its
consequences on stability and peace in the region"); S.C. Res. 713, para. 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991) (citing "the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy
loss of human life and material damage").
222. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993).
223. Id. paras. 10, 12.
224. S.C. Res. 1267, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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in the border areas of neighboring countries," 225 to declare a threat to the
peace.
There are two basic sanctions models available as "tools of
enforcement" 226 to the U.N.: comprehensive and smart sanctions. As was
the case with Iraq, Haiti, Yugoslavia (1992-95), and arguably the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), comprehensive
sanctions consist of complete trade embargoes.22 7  Such sanctions are
intended to spur change by inflicting extreme hardship on the general
population, thus indirectly causing either a literal or political revolt against
oppressive leaders;2 28  however, comprehensive sanctions are often
criticized for harming the public whose interests they have at heart. 229
Perhaps the most widely cited example of such criticism came during the
imposition of Security Council sanctions against Iraq from 1990 to 1991,
which was blamed for precipitating a massive humanitarian disaster.230
Due to such overwhelming humanitarian concerns, the logic of creating
change by imposing hardship on the public has largely been discounted and
is now referred to as the "naYve theory" of sanctions.23 1 As a result of the
perceived failures of these comprehensive programs, the U.N. has moved
away from them toward the concept of smart sanctions, which target
specific groups or individuals responsible for human rights abuses, with the
intention of reducing negative impacts on the general public. 2 32
Beginning in 1999, in cooperation with the U.N., several European
governments and experts undertook a series of studies with the goal of
formulating targeted or "smart" sanctions programs. As a result of the
Interlaken Process, which explored targeted financial sanctions;2 33 the
225. S.C. Res. 713, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 19, 1991).
226. Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?, 32
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 11, 18 (2000) (quoting former Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the
power of sanctions as an effective tool of coercion that can do grave harm).
227. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions,
in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft 1, 3 (David Cortright & George A.
Lopez eds., 2002).
228. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 19.
229. See generally August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 Am. J.
Int'l L. 851 (2001) (discussing the legality of U.N.-imposed sanctions programs).
230. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security:
Challenges to U.N. Action 27 (2002).
231. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 19; see also Joy K. Fausey, Does the
United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own
Human Rights Standards?, 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 193, 199 n.37 (1994) (citing Johan Galtung).
232. See The Swiss Confederation in Cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat and
the Watson Inst. for Int'l Studies, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and
Implementation, at vi (2001) [hereinafter Interlaken Report]; see also Cortright & Lopez,
supra note 227, at 2; Howlett, supra note 212, at 1212 (describing how targeted, or smart,
sanctions focus only on those responsible for the offending behavior and are often directed at
terrorist groups or leaders, rather than nation states).
233. See Interlaken Report, supra note 232.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Bonn-Berlin Process, which focused on arms embargoes and travel-related
sanctions; 234 and the Stockholm Process, which set forth the means to
implement and monitor these smart-sanctions programs, 235 the U.N., and
therefore the Security Council, began to adopt the recommendations set
forth in these reports. 236
There are three basic rationales behind the implementation of smart
sanctions: punitive, coercive, and demonstrative.237 Sanctions may be used
to punish a state's leaders for their objectionable behavior,238 or they may
be used to coerce leaders into compliance with demands made by the
sending group. 239  They may also be used to signal international
disapproval of the target country's behavior, acting as both a deterrent to
other potential target nations and as a means of confirming international
norms.240 Ultimately, the U.N. supports the use of sanctions as a tool of
coercion rather than as a method of punishment. 241
234. See Bonn Int'l Ctr. for Conversion, Auswairtiges Amt & the United Nations
Secretariat, Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation
Related Sanctions: Results of the 'Bonn-Berlin Process' (2001) [hereinafter Bonn-Berlin
Report].
235. Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of U.N.
Policy Options, Results from the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted
Sanctions (Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano & Mikael Eriksson eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Stockholm Report].
236. See, e.g., U.N. Sanctions Secretariat, Dep't of Political Affairs, The Experience of
the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions: An Informal
Background Paper 4-5 (1999) (detailing how the Security Council began considering
targeted sanctions as early as 1998); see also Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Hears Reports on Making Sanctions More Effective, Lessening Harm to the
Innocent: Better Monitoring of Implementation and Enforcement Called For, U.N. Doc.
SC/7183 (Oct. 22, 2001).
237. See Fishman, supra note 213, at 691 (quoting Margaret P. Doxey, International
Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives 12 (1987)). Ultimately, all types of sanctions
attempt to coerce, but at the same time they also embrace the other rationales.
238. See David R. Moran, Commentary, No Panacea: Analyzing Sanctions Before
Imposition, 27 Stetson L. Rev. 1403, 1404-05 (1998).
239. See id
240. See Carter, supra note 215, at 1170-71; see also Moran, supra note 238, at 1404-05.
Among these rationales there is spillover. As leading sanctions scholar Margaret Doxey
notes, sanctions should deter targets from engaging in the offending behavior with the threat
of punishment, but they can also serve as a warning to others. See Fishman, supra note 213,
at 690-91 (citing Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives 7
(1987)) (discussing the role of sanctions as imposing a cost on a state for its offensive
behaviors).
241. See G.A. Res. 51/242 annex I1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/242 (Sept. 26, 1997);
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 50/60, at 66-76, U.N.
Doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 1995). "The purpose of sanctions is to modify the
behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or
otherwise exact retribution." Id.; see also Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in
Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic
Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of Long-Term Effects, 18 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 167,
171 (2005).
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Within such targeted sanctions programs, there are a variety of measures
that can be applied, including selective trade embargoes, which may bar the
import of luxury goods into a country or the export of goods produced by
businesses owned by targeted individuals; financial restrictions, which
block targeted individuals' assets abroad and their access to financial
markets; travel restrictions, which bar targeted individuals from visa
eligibility and entry into certain nations; military restrictions; and
diplomatic restrictions, which prohibit specified individuals from
participating in cultural, sporting, or other international events.242  In
addition, sanctions may also block investment by foreign nationals in the
offending nation or condition the disbursement of foreign aid on
compliance with specific behaviors. 243 In fact, just the simple threat of
sanctions may result in behavior modifications and bring about the desired
effect.244 Generally, sanctions programs implement a combination of these
instruments in order to force leaders of target nations to reassess the costs of
their behaviors. 24 5
Thus far, the U.N. has chosen to respond to the Zimbabwean crisis with a
limited program of diplomacy and negotiation. The following section
highlights the success of this approach to date and explores the Mugabe
government's reaction to it.
D. The Current U.N. Response to Operations Murambatsvina and Garikai
In the face of the humanitarian crisis exacerbated by Operation
Murambatsvina and the persistent housing shortage that Operation Garikai
has failed to alleviate,24 6 the U.N. response has been limited. Before his
departure from the U.N., Secretary-General Kofi Annan dispatched Special
Envoy Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka to tour the country and report on the
situation in June 2005.247 Since the publication of her report, which
242. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot.
of Human Rights, Working Paper: The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on
the Enjoyment of Human Rights, 11-17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (June 21,
2000) (prepared by Marc Bossuyt); see also Manuel Bessler, Richard Garfield & Gerard
McHugh, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sanctions Assessment
Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions 8 (2004). An example of
diplomatic sanctions arose in 2002 when Zimbabwe was suspended from the
Commonwealth after observers questioned the validity of Presidential election results. See
Timeline: Zimbabwe, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/countryprofiles/1831470.stm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
In the 1970s and until 1992, South Africa was barred from competing in many international
sporting events, including the Olympics, via an international boycott. See Europeans Lift
South Africa Sports Boycott, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1991, at L3.
243. See Howlett, supra note 212, at 1211.
244. See Geiss, supra note 241, at 170.
245. See generally Cortright & Lopez, supra note 227, at 10-15 (offering a broad
overview of the four main tools of sanctions: travel, financial, trade, and arms restrictions).
246. See supra Part I.A-B.
247. See generally Tibaijuka, supra note 2.
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condemned the Zimbabwean government for creating an enormous
humanitarian crisis and suggested that its actions could potentially be
labeled a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute,248 the U.N. has
done little else to address the needs of Murambatsvina's victims. 249 A
combination of disorganization on the part of U.N. agencies 250 and
resistance from forces within Zimbabwe has left victims with limited
assistance. 251
Initially the U.N. seemed hopeful about addressing the needs of the
displaced; however, the Mugabe government soon stepped in to frustrate its
efforts.252  The International Organization for Migration, an
intergovernmental body that works closely with the U.N., reported that it
had reached forty-nine percent of households in need of food aid during
June through September 2005.253 However, in August 2005 food programs
were severely curtailed when the Minister of Social Welfare prohibited the
distribution of food aid to victims still living in urban areas and perhaps to
all victims. 254 That same August, the Zimbabwean police dismantled more
than one hundred tents of plastic sheeting, informing U.N. representatives
that such tents were prohibited. 255 By October 2005, the government had
rejected U.N. offers of temporary tents as shelters, denying that a
humanitarian crisis still existed,256 and by December 2005, the government
248. See id. at 9. Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, defines a
crime against humanity as one of several enumerated acts that is "committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153, art. 7.
Included among the enumerated acts are "[d]eportation or forcible transfer of population,"
"[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity," and "[o]ther inhumane acts of a
similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health." Id. Tibaijuka concedes that such a suit would be difficult to sustain. See
Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 9.
249. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 37.
250. See id. at 58-60.
251. See id. at 54-55.
252. See supra Part I.A.3.c.
253. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 57.
254. See id. at 56. Statistics on the success of food-aid programs operating in Zimbabwe
are incomplete. This may be due to disorganization on the part of NGOs and the U.N., but it
may also be due to the need of these agencies to keep their activities confidential from
government officials. Unfortunately, Human Rights Watch reports that the majority of its
interviewees across the country had received little or no aid by December 2005; however, it
is difficult to confirm or deny these statements. See id. at 55-56. In an uncharacteristic
reversal, in 2006 the government began resettling white farmers on previously seized farms
in a late attempt to subvert the impending and likely severe food crisis. See Zimbabwe
Confirms White Farm Move, BBC News, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4937310.stm.
255. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 22.
256. See Annan Appeals to Zimbabwe to Let U.N. Help Homeless After Government
Rejects Aid, U.N. News Service, Oct. 31, 2005,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=16426&Cr-zimbabwe&Crl=; see also
Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 21-22; Mugabe Rejects Offer of U.N. Tents, BBC
News, Dec. 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afiica/4501976.stm (quoting President
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had rebuffed U.N. offers of temporary brick-and-asbestos homes, claiming
that they were substandard.257 Aid workers speculate that these rejections
were an attempt to hide the magnitude of the crisis the government had
created,2 58 complementing its policies of obstructing aid workers' access to
transit camps and punishing those groups and individuals who accepted aid
from NGOs and the U.N. 259 Thus far, the U.N.'s assistance efforts appear
to have been frustrated at every turn.
In response to these roadblocks, the U.N. and its affiliate organizations
have resorted to "quiet diplomacy" 260 in order to negotiate with the Mugabe
government over the distribution of aid and the construction of homes. 26 1
Human Rights Watch alleges that the U.N.'s strategy of negotiating with
oppressive governments rather than taking a more aggressive stance has
long been ineffective. 262 Suggesting that the U.N. has adopted this position
out of a fear of being denied any access to displaced populations, Human
Rights Watch points out that, at least in Zimbabwe, the U.N.'s access has
been so limited that they really "have little to lose" by becoming more vocal
about the Mugabe regime's human rights abuses.
263
E. Summary
Zimbabwe continues to suffer from the long-term effects of Operation
Murambatsvina, 264 with aftershocks permeating the health, education,
employment, housing, and economic sectors. Operation Garikai, widely
characterized as mere rhetoric conceived in response to international and
U.N. criticism, 26 5 appears to have failed in its efforts to address the
consequences of Murambatsvina's destruction. As the international body
legally charged with protecting and promoting international peace and
security, the U.N. can adopt a strategy of diplomacy, international criminal
prosecution, military intervention, or sanctions to address the humanitarian
crisis in Zimbabwe. Such a decision depends on a number of important
Mugabe's spokesman, who declared, "[W]e are not tents people .... Tents just don't auger
[sic] well with our culture").
257. See Solidarity Peace Trust, supra note 7, at 69; see also Zimbabwe: UN "Puzzled"
by Govt Response to Model House, IRIN News, Dec. 21, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=50813.
258. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 24. Many of those directly affected by
the operation still remain unaccounted for, having been trucked to remote rural areas in an
effort to hide them from Tibaijuka's investigations. See Confidential Interview with
Bulawayan church minister, supra note 87.
259. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 23 (noting that two transit camps in
Bulawayo and Harare were closed immediately after the Special Envoy's visit and that one
in Mutare was closed just prior to her visit).
260. See supra Part I.C. 1.
261. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 38.
262. See id at 59-60.
263. Id. at 60.
264. See generally Amnesty Int'l, supra note 1.
265. See supra Part I.B.
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considerations; however, it is clear that "[t]here are no easy answers"266 to
this difficult question of politics, economics, and survival.
II. ZIMBABWE'S LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE POSSIBLE
U.N. RESPONSES TO THE OPERATIONS
In its attempt to locate a feasible and realistic U.N. response to the
humanitarian crisis exacerbated by Operation Murambatsvina, this Note
focuses on a program of restrictive sanctions as a potential reaction. In Part
II, the Note introduces the debate surrounding the U.N.'s response. In
particular, Part II.A explores Zimbabwe's legal accountability under
international and domestic law in order to determine whether a stronger
U.N. response is necessary. Part II.B then examines the options available to
the U.N. in the event of legal liability, exploring the obstacles raised by
each alternative but with a focus on sanctions.
A. Zimbabwe's Potential Legal Accountability
In most cases, U.N. action does not require specific legal infractions, but
rather a "threat to the peace." 267 Nonetheless, specific violations may help
to justify a U.N. program of intervention or otherwise. In crafting a
response to human rights abuses, the U.N. may look to the U.N. Charter, the
Declaration on Human Rights, international treaties, customary law, and
even domestic law to determine whether violations have taken place and at
what level. This section explores the various laws and treaties to which
Zimbabwe is (or is not) subject and examines the arguments for their
application.
1. Possible Violations of the U.N. Charter
As a signatory to the U.N. Charter, 268 Zimbabwe has a legal obligation
under articles 55 and 56 to uphold the principles of peace and security set
forth in it.269 However, a close reading of the text reveals that articles
2(4)270 and 2(7)271 could be construed to prohibit the intervention of foreign
266. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 21.
267. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
268. Zimbabwe became a U.N. member state on August 25, 1980. See List of Member
States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
269. U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56. Article 55 sets out the U.N.'s mandate, which involves the
promotion of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development" alongside "solutions of international economic, social,
health and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation[,]" as
well as "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. Charter art. 55. Article
56 imposes a legal obligation on member states to further the purposes set out in article 55.
U.N. Charter art. 56; see also U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1-3 (setting out the fundamental
purpose of the U.N. body).
270. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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nations or organizations in what may be described as a sovereign nation's
internal matters. For example, article 2(4) restricts member states from
threatening to use or using force against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." 272 More explicitly, article 2(7) advises member
states that
(n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter V11. 2 7 3
Interpretations of the articles vary. Some argue that "[a]rticle 2(4)
essentially prohibits states from using force against one another. '274 But
what is force? Those who favor a broad reading of the term posit that
article 2(4) encompasses any form of coercion, including military action
and sanctions. 275 Others adhere to a narrower interpretation, which restricts
members only from using military force, thereby indicating that the broad
reading "is speculation." 276 On the other hand, while article 2(4) deals with
the use of force by individual states and groups against other states, article
2(7) deals more broadly with whether or not the U.N. itself can use force as
a means of intervention. 277 Article 2(7) raises the question of how we
determine when a conflict or crisis lies solely within a state's domestic
jurisdiction 278 and therefore whether the U.N. is authorized to intervene.
While the "non-intervention clause" 279 of article 2(7) restricts any
intervention in such domestic matters, the drafters qualified the prohibition
by including language that allows the U.N. to intervene under chapter VII
271. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
272. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
273. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
274. Franck, supra note 186, at 2.
275. For example, during the drafting of the charter, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
eight African states unsuccessfully proposed that the term "force" should include economic
pressure, as the term "armed force" was used overtly in articles 41, 42, 43, and 46 of the
charter. Therefore, under their logic, the generic term "force" must have an alternate
meaning. See Omer Yousif Elagab, The Legality of Non-forcible Counter-measures in
International Law 199 (1988). The travaux preparatoires for the article indicate otherwise.
Apparently, Brazil proposed an amendment to "the original Dumbarton Oaks Draft Article
2(4) as follows: 'All Members of the Organisation shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force and from the threat or use of economic measures in
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation."' Id. at 198. The amendment
was rejected, making it clear that delegates had no intention of barring economic sanctions
under the charter. On the contrary, the U.S. delegate indicated that the authors of the
original text intended just the opposite-that "or in any other manner" should be all-
inclusive. Id. at 198; see also Franck, supra note 186, at 11-15 (further elaborating on the
drafting of articles 2(4) and 2(7)).
276. Elagab, supra note 275, at 199.
277. See Franck, supra note 186, at 12.
278. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
279. Franck, supra note 186, at 13.
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via a finding of a "threat to the peace 280 or a "breach of the peace" 281
under article 39. The "elasticity" 282 of these two articles results in, at the
very least, "a murky text. '283
The responsibility to protect doctrine 284 attempts to eliminate much of
this murkiness, shifting the focus of the U.N. from relations between states
to the promotion and enforcement of human rights regardless of
boundaries. 285 However, this refocusing on universal human rights over
sovereignty has given rise to claims of injustice and assertions that it poses
a "threat to the peaceful order based on respect for state sovereignty. '286 In
fact, President Mugabe himself, as well as members of his cabinet, often
claims that unilateral sanctions already being imposed against him and
other high-level officials by the United States, European Union, and other
nations 287 are illegally interfering in what are exclusively Zimbabwean
280. U.N. Charter art. 39.
281. Id.
282. See Franck, supra note 186, at 13.
283. Id.
284. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
285. See Jeffrey K. Walker, The Demise of the Nation-State, The Dawn of New Paradigm
Warfare, and a Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. Rev. 323, 325 (2001). Walker
discusses the contrast between the traditional Westphalian model of international relations
and the post-Westphalian model, in which
1) what a sovereign does to his own people isn't necessarily his own
business-and other states may rightfully intervene under certain conditions; 2)
non-state entities such as international organizations, regional alliances, and non-
governmental organizations have a place at the international table; and 3) there are
some universally applicable ideas that no one gets to reject, such as the inherent
right of persons to fundamental human rights, the right of peoples to self-
determination, and perhaps the right of everyone to democratic governance and
environmental protection.
Id.
286. Franck, supra note 186, at 19.
287. In 2001 the United States passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery
Act, which legislated unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe in response to President Bush's
"deep concerns about the political and economic hardships visited upon Zimbabwe by that
country's leadership." Statement on Signing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act of 2001, 2 Pub. Papers 1543 (Dec. 21, 2001); see generally Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-99, 115 Stat. 962
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp. 1 2001)). In doing so, the United States attached
conditions on aid to the country and to any consideration of debt relief or forgiveness
through the major international banking institutions. See 22 U.S.C. § 215 1(d).
In 2003 President George W. Bush made official a unilateral sanctions regime against
Zimbabwe via Executive Order 13,288, which blocks the property of 77 people and prohibits
Americans from doing business with them or parties acting on their behalf. See Exec. Order
No. 13,288, 3 C.F.R. 186 (2004). The November 2005 amendment to this order extended
the list to 128 people and 33 businesses (primarily farms), blocking the family members of
listed individuals. See Exec. Order No. 13,391, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2006). Most recently, on
February 27, 2006, the President extended these sanctions for another year. See Notice,
Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe, 72 Fed. Reg. 9,645
(Mar. 2, 2007).
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matters.2 88 He would undoubtedly object to U.N. interference. While the
drafters of the charter did not clarify whether or not they granted the
Security Council the power to intervene in domestic matters absent a
finding of a threat to the peace, 289 reference to the council's practice reveals
its frequent exploitation of the murkiness of article 2(7).290
2. Possible Violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Zimbabwe is also obligated by the principles set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.29 1 While the document was originally
considered aspirational, it is now widely accepted as binding law either
through customary international law or incorporation via articles 55 and 56
of the U.N. Charter.292 In the case at hand, the actions of Zimbabwean
officials in implementing Operation Murambatsvina could be read to violate
a number of rights enumerated in the declaration, most importantly the right
to be free from discrimination based on property, birth, or social origin;29 3
In 2007, the European Union renewed its program of targeted sanctions against 130
specific Zimbabwean officials and their family members, including an arms embargo and a
freeze on individuals' funds. See Council Decision 235/CFSP, 2007 O.J. (L 101) 14.
In addition, Australia and New Zealand have imposed similar programs against
individuals in Zimbabwe. See Media Release, Alexander Downer, Member of Parliament &
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, Tighter Sanctions Against Zimbabwe (June 14,
2005) (on file with author); New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Republic of
Zimbabwe, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Africa/Zimbabwe.php (last visited Aug. 20,
2007). Furthermore, in 2005 New Zealand banned all sports teams representing Zimbabwe
from entering New Zealand. See id.
288. For example, in response to the imposition of European Union sanctions in 2002,
then-Information Minister Jonathan Moyo declared, "It is very clear that what we are now
dealing with is organised economic terrorism whose aim is clear and is to unseat a
legitimately elected government which has decided to defend its national independence and
national sovereignty." Anger over Zimbabwe Sanctions, CNN.com, Feb. 19, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/02/18/zimbabwe.eu/index.html. In the past,
similar claims have come not only from smaller states, which fear a reprise of colonialism
and the erosion of their sovereignty, but also from larger states, including China, which hope
to avoid foreign criticisms of internal human rights matters. See John Stremlau, Sharpening
International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations 19 (1996).
289. See Franck, supra note 186, at 14.
290. See id. at 14. In the past, the Security Council has responded to crises that could be
construed as domestic matters, including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. "To
understand the real meaning of Article 2(7), therefore, it is necessary to turn to these and
other practical responses of the Organization, rather than rely solely on the drafting history
or a parsing of the text." Id.
291. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). When Zimbabwe became a U.N. member state on Aug. 25, 1980, it
became a signatory to the declaration. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
292. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 287, 289, 317-19 (1995); see
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Promise to Humanity,
http://www.udhr.org/history/default.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
293. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 291, art. 2.
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the right to life and security of person; 294 the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; 295 the right to an effective remedy; 296 the
right to be free from arbitrary arrest 297 and interference with one's privacy
and family; 29 the right to freedom of movement; 299 the right to property
and to be free from arbitrary deprivation of it;300 and the rights to work,301
an adequate standard of living,30 2 education, 30 3 and social and international
order,304 among others.
In the event of such allegations, the government can raise two arguments
against legal accountability under the declaration and other treaties. First,
Zimbabwe has already claimed that its program of mass evictions is legal
under local bylaws. In implementing Operation Murambatsvina, the
government relied almost exclusively on the Regional, Town and Country
Planning Act.30 5 Regardless of whether the act is still a valid piece of
legislation postindependence, it requires the removal of structures built
without the authority of the local government. 30 6 However, the act also
provides for a thirty-day notice period, during which time residents can
challenge their removal or make alternative provisions. 30 7 Second, the
government can attempt to invoke the Universal Declaration's article 29(2),
which allows for the restriction of certain enumerated rights in order to
meet the "just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society."308 The government characterized the pre-
Murambatsvina status of urban areas as a danger to public health, morals,
national security, and the economy and stated in its response to Tibaijuka's
report that "the Operation had to be undertaken without further delay. '30 9
Setting aside doubts about the urgency of the operation, 310 article 30 of the
294. See id. art. 3.
295. See id art. 5.
296. See id art. 8.
297. See id. art. 9.
298. See id. art. 12.
299. See id. art. 13.
300. See id. art. 17.
301. See id. art. 23.
302. See id art. 25 (guaranteeing the "right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services," in addition to "the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control").
303. See id. art. 26.
304. See id. art. 28.
305. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act 1976 [Ch. 29:12] (Zimb.); see also
Gov't of Zimb., supra note 35, at 27 (discussing the legitimacy of the act and the operation).
306. Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, supra note 305, § 35; see also Tibaijuka,
supra note 2, at 57.
307. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 57.
308. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 291, art. 29, para. 2.
309. Gov't of Zimb., supra note 35, at 30.
310. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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declaration limits the extent to which a state may restrict an individual's
exercise of these rights, stating, "Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein."'3 11
3. Possible Violations of Customary International Law
Zimbabwe may also be bound under principles of customary
international law, as outlined by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law. The Restatement defines customary international law as
resulting from a "general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation."' 3 12 Under this definition, customary
international law could be interpreted to impose an affirmative duty on
states not to engage in and to prohibit gross violations of human rights,
including "acts of aggression," "acts of genocide," and other violations of
the "basic rights of the human person." 3 13 Nonetheless, any claim that
international customary law has been violated requires proof that the
"custom has become so established as to be legally binding," according to
the International Court of Justice. 3 14 This "attitude of judicial caution"
comports with the recurring theme of respect for a state's sovereignty in the
international courts. 315
Since the norms of international customary law are not set out in a treaty,
the concept seems almost limitless. While the International Court of Justice
counsels caution in finding violations of international customary law, 316 one
may also find shape for these norms in nonbinding guidelines issued by
advisory bodies such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (now
Council), which has declared "that the practice of forced evictions
constitutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to
adequate housing." 317 Furthermore, the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights defines forced evictions as "'the permanent or
temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the
provision of and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other
protection.' 318 The U.N.'s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
311. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 291, art. 30.
312. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987).
313. Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice 313
(1989).
314. Id. at 377.
315. Id.
316. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
317. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1993/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/77
(Mar. 10, 1993).
318. Amnesty Int'l, Mass Forced Evictions in Luanda: A Call for a Human-Rights Based
Housing Policy, at 4-5, Al Index AFR 12/007/2003, Nov. 12, 2003 (quoting the U.N. Econ.
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which add weight to the customary law argument and which protect
individuals from arbitrary displacement as a collective punishment, 319
ensure the investigation of alternatives to displacement320 and guarantee the
provision of replacement housing in the event of displacement. 321 Finally,
the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration, 322 the violations set out
in the Rome Statute,323 and the principles in the U.N. Charter also help craft
customary international law claims.
4. Possible Violations of International and Regional Treaties
A number of international and regional treaties applicable to Zimbabwe
expand on the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration. 324 These
treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;325
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 326 the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;327 and
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.328 Zimbabwe is
also a member state of the African Union and has ratified the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.329 Zimbabwe could argue that its
suspension of certain non-fundamental rights is permitted under the treaties'
various derogation clauses; 330 however, the government did not file an
& Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Housing
(Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, General Comment No. 7, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 annex IV
(May 20, 1997), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/959f7 le476284596802564c3005d8d50?Opendo
cument.
319. See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, princ. 6.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
320. See id. at princ. 7.1.
321. See id. at princ. 7.2.
322. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 291.
323. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153.
324. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 291.
325. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
326. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
327. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
328. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
329. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
330. For example, see article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which reads:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
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emergency derogation with the U.N. under any of the relevant provisions
prior to the inception of the operation.
5. Possible Violations of Zimbabwean Domestic Law
Finally, the Zimbabwean government may be accountable for human
rights violations under its domestic laws. Section 16 of the Zimbabwean
Constitution guarantees individuals "reasonable notice" in the event of
"reasonably necessary" acquisition of property by the government. 33 1
Furthermore, the Zimbabwean Constitution enumerates a catalog of rights
that echoes those found in the Universal Declaration and the related
treaties, 3 32 including the right to be free from inhuman treatment, 333 the
right to the secure protection of the law,334 and the right to be free from
discrimination. 335 In its response to Tibaijuka's report, the Zimbabwean
government argued that Operation Murambatsvina was simply a means of
enforcing the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act,336 but the various
international treaties to which Zimbabwe is a signatory require that the
government incorporate those principles into domestic legislation. 337
Therefore, the government may have violated such treaties.
In conclusion, there are a number of local, regional, and international
laws in place that Operation Murambatsvina and its hasty implementation
may have violated. While the issue of Zimbabwe's legal accountability
may certainly be debated, the U.N., in its role as global defender of human
rights, has a number of responses available to violations of these laws. The
following section explores the logistics of using these responses.
B. The Debate Surrounding the Potential U.N. Responses
In formulating a response to Operation Murambatsvina and its
exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, the U.N. has several
options available, including diplomatic negotiations, prosecution in the
ICC, or Security Council action under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
This section investigates the arguments for and against the different U.N.
responses, paying particular attention to sanctions.
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 325, art. 4.
331. Zimb. Const. (as amended Sept. 14, 2005), § 16.
332. See id. §§ 11-26.
333. Id. § 15.
334. Id. § 18.
335. Id. § 23.
336. See Gov't of Zimb., supra note 35, at 27.
337. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 832-33, 832 n.110 ("A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." (quoting the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331)).
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1. Diplomacy and Negotiation
In response to the crisis in Zimbabwe, the U.N. may opt to maintain its
current approach of diplomacy and negotiation, while also continuing to
deliver humanitarian assistance and implement aid programs. Such
negotiations can provide a safe, nonconfrontational environment for sharing
perceptions and exploring potential resolutions,3 38 creating a dialogue that
may result in change. However, in adopting a program of diplomatic
engagement, the U.N. may face several problems. A conflict may remain
intractable, meaning that the "costs of a political settlement are appreciably
lower (and recognized to be so) than the military and political costs of
continued fighting," 339 and therefore the negotiating parties remain at a
stalemate. 340 A state may resist external interference, either preferring to
solve the conflict itself or barring others from attempting to resolve it.
341
Finally, if mediation or negotiation is pursued, the simple fact that so many
other parties may become involved, including states, NGOs, and civic
groups, means that the U.N.'s authority over the situation is diluted, and it
therefore must "choose its negotiating opportunities with care." 342
The U.N. has long relied on South African President Thabo Mbeki to
negotiate with Mugabe on political matters; however, critics argue that
Mbeki's failure to create change in Zimbabwe makes him complicit in
Zimbabwe's ongoing oppression.34 3 Further illustrating the challenges of
Mbeki's approach, in the past Mugabe has rejected Mbeki's suggestions
that the U.N. broker a package of international aid in exchange for
Mugabe's retirement. 344  At a recent Southern African Development
Community summit, Mugabe's Minister of Justice, Patrick Chinamasa,
declared, "Political reform is not necessary in [Zimbabwe] .... -345 On the
topic of Operation Murambatsvina's forced evictions, Mbeki has said little
publicly. 346 While Mbeki's public silence is not indicative of his progress
(or lack thereof), the "real questions are whether something sensible is
being pursued consequentially or whether the lack of volume and visibility
is a cover for doing too little or even nothing at all."'347
338. See Nan, supra note 155.
339. Fen Osler Hampson, Can the U.N. Still Mediate?, in The United Nations and Global
Security 75, 83 (Richard M. Price & Mark W. Zacher eds., 2004).
340. See id.
341. See id. at 83-84.
342. Id. at 85.
343. See, e.g., Sebastian Mallaby, Zimbabwe's Enabler: South Africa Falls Short as
Monitor of Democracy, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 2005, at A2 1.
344. See Peta Thornycroft, Mugabe Rejects United Nations Mediation of Crisis, Voice of
America, May 25, 2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-25-
voa50.cfm?CFID=87316319&CFTOKEN=50792461.
345. See No Pressure on Mugabe from Summit, supra note 158.
346. See Warren Hoge, U.N. Condemns Zimbabwe for Bulldozing Urban Slums, N.Y.
Times, July 23, 2005, at A5.
347. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 20.
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2. International Criminal Prosecution
Various states and NGOs have accused those responsible for Zimbabwe's
human rights abuses of violating the Rome Statute of the ICC; 348 however,
the U.N. may face several challenges in proceeding with a referral to the
ICC. First, were the Zimbabwean government to admit that any crime had
occurred, it could raise the defense that the ICC is intended as a "court of
last resort 34 9 and that it had, in fact, conducted its own investigation, thus
precluding any prosecution. Second, the human rights violations to which
Operation Murambatsvina gave rise may not fall under the rubric of "crime
against humanity," which the Rome Statute's article 7 defines as any of a
series of enumerated acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack. '3 50  Relevant acts include deportation or forcible transfer,
deprivation of physical liberty, persecution against a group based on race or
other protected characteristic, or other similar acts that intentionally cause
serious physical or mental injury. 35 1 Article 7(2)(d) further defines the
provision concerning deportation as forcible displacement by "expulsion or
other coercive acts." 352 Finally, the court is likely to adhere to a strict
interpretation of the crimes over which it holds jurisdiction. 353
When deciding on a course of action, the U.N. must also keep in mind its
mandate, set out in the preamble of the U.N. Charter, which calls for the
establishment of "conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained. '354 In the event that the court does find that Murambatsvina
constitutes a crime against humanity, a case could be brought both against
lower level officials, who publicly initiated the operation, 355 and the
president, who dispatched the army to ensure its implementation. 3 56
However, while criminal accountability is arguably a vital part of this
mandate, the U.N. itself has acknowledged that such a debate "would serve
only to distract the attention of the international community from focusing
on the humanitarian crisis facing the displaced. '3 57 Adding to the difficulty
of bringing such an action, an ICC prosecution may be subject to
348. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 816.
349. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
350. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153, art. 7.
351. See id.
352. Id. art. 7(2)(d); see also Nicolai, supra note 77, at 826-27.
353. See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Nicolai, supra note 77, at 839-
40.
354. U.N. Charter pmbl.
355. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
356. See Nicolai, supra note 77, at 838.
357. Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 66.
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accusations that it "represents an undue usurpation of state sovereignty" 358
due to the jurisdictional reach of the court, or that it offers more powerful
nations the opportunity to manipulate developing nations whose legal
systems cannot undertake their own prosecutions. 359  By focusing on
criminal accountability rather than coercion, such prosecutions may not
further or could even undermine the U.N.'s immediate goals with respect to
Zimbabwe. 36
0
3. Military Action Under Chapter VII
In response to a threat to the peace, the U.N. may also choose to pursue
military intervention under the U.N. Charter's chapter VII. The
implementation of a military campaign carries with it substantial hurdles
that may be difficult to overcome, including the commitment of troops and
military equipment by member states. 36 1 Moreover, the use of force is
subject to the doctrine of proportionality; it must be "proportionate to the
unlawful aggression that gave rise to the right. ' 362  In assessing the
proportionality of a potential recourse to force, the U.N. asks whether the
"scale, duration and intensity" of the response is the minimum required to
respond to the situation.3 63 The U.N. also recommends weighing a number
of other factors in its determination of whether to deploy military force in
response to a threat or crisis, including whether the unlawful aggression
gives rise to "genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or
serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently
apprehended" 364 and, most important, whether all other nonmilitary options
have been exhausted.365 Finally, doubts about the legitimacy of any use of
military force will always linger.3 66 On the contrary, the spare use of the
veto by permanent members36 7 indicates that a Security Council resolution
mandating military force in response to human rights abuses might not be
rejected due to a lack of political will, contrary to popular belief.368 In
358. See Joanne Lee & Richard Price, International Tribunals and the Criminalization of
International Violence, in The United Nations and Global Security, supra note 339, at 123,
131.
359. See id. at 132.
360. See Itai Mushekwe, Mugabe Unfazed by Chance of Facing Law,
zimbabwejoumalists.com, Jan. 14, 2007,
http://www.zimbabwejoumalists.com/print.php?artid=1583 (describing the failure of the
threat of international criminal prosecution to alter President Mugabe's stance).
361. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
362. See Gardam, supra note 201, at 391.
363. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 187, at 67.
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. See id at 36.
367. See supra note 195.
368. See Joseph Kahn, China Courts Africa, Angling for Strategic Gains, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 2006, at Al (indicating that China may be shifting from its long-held foreign policy
of refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign nations while courting
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essence, the question with which the U.N. must grapple concerning the use
of force is whether or not there is a "reasonable chance of success in halting
or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of
inaction." 3 69
4. Sanctions Under Chapter VII
Finally, the U.N. may opt for a program of sanctions to coerce the
Mugabe government into compliance with its own plan to rehouse the
victims of Operation Murambatsvina. 370 The imposition of sanctions is a
deeply debated issue that gives rise to a number of political, economic, and
humanitarian criticisms.
a. Measuring the Success of Sanctions and Ensuring Effective Enforcement
Perhaps the greatest criticisms of sanctions programs arise out of doubts
about the U.N.'s ability to effectively monitor member states' enforcement
of such programs 371 and sanctions' notoriously low rate of success in
achieving their stated objectives.3 72 The central goal of targeted sanctions
is to increase the cost of engaging in a particular behavior while minimizing
the impact on the general population, which can only be achieved through
enforcement by all member states. 373 As U.N. member states, Zimbabwe's
neighbors have a duty to monitor sanctions violations being perpetrated
African trade to a policy of, at least rhetorically, encouraging human rights compliance and
good governance). In recent years, President Mugabe has pursued a "Look East" economic
policy, which entailed negotiating business deals with China and Russia in the face of
Western sanctions. The policy suggested that China or Russia was likely to veto any
suggestion of sanctions to protect their economic interests. Analysts have deemed the
program mere "propaganda." Zimbabwe's "Look East Policy" Fails to Deliver, Bus. Day,
Oct. 16, 2006, www.businessday.co.za/articles/world.aspx?ID=BD4A290255 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This news contributes to the hope that the push for sanctions to
enforce human rights is not without merit. Id. (indicating both that Zimbabwe's push to
increase trade and political relations with China after unilateral sanctions were imposed has
not helped the Zimbabwean economy and that economists doubt that Zimbabwe's latest
business deals with Moscow will help either).
369. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 187, at 67.
370. See supra Part I.B.
371. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 5-6 (discussing how, throughout the
1990s, the U.N. lacked the ability to enforce sanctions effectively due to insufficient
resources); see also Stremlau, supra note 288, at 48.
372. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in Smart
Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, supra note 227, at 171, 171. Studies have
discouragingly placed the general success rate of sanctions at as low as five percent. See
Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 14 (discussing a report by Robert Pape). A survey of
the 116 sanctions programs implemented between 1914 and 1990 calculated a success rate of
less than one-third. See id. Targeted sanctions appear to have fared no better. See Elliott,
supra, at 171.
373. See Elliott, supra note 372, at 171.
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across their borders,3 74 but the U.N. must also work with local NGOs to
collect details regarding the effects of sanctions on the general population.
Successfully inflicting a real cost on targeted individuals and avoiding a
humanitarian disaster, such as the Iraqi program produced,375 depends on
the U.N.'s ability to gather reliable data from sources embedded in the
target nations. 376 As globalization increases, the U.N. will find it more
difficult to enforce sanctions due to the interdependence of businesses, the
complexity of financial transactions, 377 and the prevalence of the informal
economy, especially in Zimbabwe. 378 Furthermore, to incentivize U.N.
enforcement demands on member states, larger nations may offer trade and
other financial benefits to induce cooperation among neighboring countries,
which may be adversely affected by enforcing the sanctions program. 379
When measuring the success rate of sanctions, the analysis depends on
more than just the achievement of stated coercive goals; there are also
unstated demonstrative goals to be considered. 380 These include, but are
not limited to, the deterrence of future violations, the creation of alliances,
the announced adherence to and therefore strengthening of international
principles by sending nations, and the sending of symbolic messages of
disapproval to the target nation.381 Therefore, the success of a particular
sanctions regime depends not only on the U.N.'s ability to enforce the
program and the subsequent achievement of stated goals, but also largely on
the goals being considered.
b. Misuse of Sanctions
Sanctions have also been criticized as a means to neocolonial ends, where
sending nations or groups are viewed as imposing sanctions to further their
own economic, cultural, or political interests. In response to sanctions,
politicians, including President Mugabe, have declared that such programs
force Western norms upon sovereign nations in an effort to continue or to
374. See U.N. Charter art. 49.
375. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
376. Such information aids in shaping effective sanctions programs as well as assessing
the likelihood of a political backlash by providing insight on the attitudes of civic groups, the
media, religious institutions, businesses, and other organizations, while also lending
legitimacy to the entire scheme. See Stremlau, supra note 288, at 52.
377. See id. at 54.
378. See supra notes 10, 48 and accompanying text.
379. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 227, at 10 (discussing how the success of any
sanctions program depends on enforcement and international cooperation); see also Margaret
P. Doxey, United Nations Economic Sanctions: Minimizing Adverse Effects on Nontarget
States, in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, supra note 227, at 183, 194-95
(discussing the need to minimize the effects of sanctions on non-target states); infra Part
II.B.4.d.
380. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
381. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 16.
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renew colonialism. 3 82  In Zimbabwe, critics have branded unilateral
sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom and the United States as
racist. 383  Such declarations contribute to a "rally round the flag
phenomenon, ' '3s 4 whereby targeted individuals mobilize feelings of
nationalism that unite the general population and redirect their discontent
against the sender.385 For example, critics of the U.N. sanctions program
against Iraq claim that, while the sanctions' stated objective was to remove
Saddam Hussein from power, he was able to retain his position due to his
ability to convince Iraqis that they were victims of Western aggression.
Such critics also claim that the sanctions carried unarticulated goals,
including furthering Western interests in Iraqi natural resources and the
expansion of Western military power in the region.386
Furthermore, sanctions have been criticized as being mere pretext for
military action, which is used to further sending nations' goals. 387 For
example, in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti, military force followed on the
heels of the implementation of economic sanctions.388  In contrast,
supporters characterize sanctions as "a form of economic warfare," 3 89 and,
in fact, sanctions may actually be most effective when targeted leaders
suspect that sending nations will resort to military force to ensure the
success of their goals.3
90
382. Such statements are published regularly in Zimbabwe's state-controlled newspapers
or broadcast on the single nationalized television station. For example, President Mugabe, in
response to local opposition calls for tougher sanctions, declared in 2004, "We can't discuss
[this] with allies of the Western countries that would want to destroy our economy.... The
devil is the devil.., we have no idea of supping with the devil." Mugabe Says No to Talks
"with Devil," BBC News, Feb. 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3516261.stm
(internal quotation marks omitted). Other high-level ZANU-PF officials, including then-
Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, have made similar statements in response to U.S.-
imposed sanctions: "These Americans who are pontificating about human rights and
democracy would not recognize these things even if they hit them on their faces. So go tell
the imperialist to go to hell." Sharon LaFraniere, Zimbabwe Reports Seizing Plane with 64
Suspected Mercenaries, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2004, at A10. When pressed on the fact that
his farms might be included on the U.S. sanctions list, Moyo continued, saying, "I am
flattered that these hamburger-eating imperialists are interested in my tomatoes ... but I am
sending them to Mbare Musika [referring to a produce market in Harare]." Sanctions: Zim
Tells US to "Go to Hell, " iafrica.com, Mar. 4, 2004,
http://africa.iafrica.com/c2cnews/307458.htm; see also Basildon Peta, Mugabe Marks 81st
Birthday with Challenge to His Critics, Indep. (London), Feb. 22, 2005, at 24.
383. See US Sanctions Are Racist Attack, Says Zim Official, SABC News, Mar. 8, 2003,
http://www.sabcnews.com/africasouthern africa/0,2172,54675,00.html. Other targeted
leaders have echoed Mugabe's allegations. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Qaddafi Rants
Against the U.S. in a Welcoming After Bomb Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al.
384. Andrew Mack & Asif Khan, U.N. Sanctions: A Glass Half Full?, in The United
Nations and Global Security, supra note 339, at 109, 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
385. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 20-21.
386. See Fishman, supra note 213, at 688.
387. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 6-7.
388. Id. at 2.
389. Id. at 7.
390. Id.
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Requests from credible groups within the target nation may help to
justify the imposition of sanctions, supporting their legitimacy and speaking
to their likely political success. 391  In Zimbabwe, in response to the
controversial 2002 presidential elections, 392 the nation's most widely hailed
church leader, Pius Ncube, Archbishop of Bulawayo, called for South
Africa and other nations to implement a total economic blockade of the
country, under the logic that this would force Mugabe into negotiations
over humanitarian issues. 393 In addition, also in response to the 2002
election outcome, the defeated MDC called for increased sanctions against
ZANU-PF. 394 Such calls serve as a counter to those who claim that U.N.
sanctions programs reflect imperialistic intentions.
Adding further support, sanctions may carry beneficial effects for the
target nation. For example, they may serve as a sign of international
solidarity to those attempting to oppose an oppressive regime. 395 They may
also provide encouragement to local NGOs providing humanitarian aid,
indicating that the international community is working for change.396
Finally, the presence of a sanctions program may be used as evidence of
crimes in the event of eventual prosecutions. 397
c. Unintended Consequences for Third-Party Nations
Third-party nations may feel unintended adverse economic effects of
sanctions, especially in comprehensive programs, and this may lead to lax
efforts 398 in enforcing the program against the target.399 Relevant costs to
non-target nations include the loss of export markets and imported goods
and services, interruption to infrastructure systems, and enforcement costs,
among others.400 Article 50 of the U.N. Charter guarantees non-target
nations the right to "consult the Security Council with regard to a solution"
391. Id. at 21.
392. See Europe Renews Zimbabwe Sanctions, BBC News, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4284689.stm; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
393. See Chris McGreal, South Africa Under Fire for Failure to Act in Mugabe Crisis,
Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 21, 2007, at 24; see also Zimbabwe Crisis 'Threatens Lives,' BBC
News, July 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6288038.stm. Archbishop of
Bulawayo Pius Ncube "accused President Robert Mugabe's government of not taking
responsibility for the deepening crisis." Id.
394. See Mugabe 's Wife on EU Sanctions List, BBC News World Edition, July 22, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2143442.stm.
395. See also Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 20-21. For example, both the
African National Congress in South Africa and the Lavalas in Haiti benefited from the
solidarity provided by sanctions. See id. at 21.
396. See id. at 20-21.
397. See Stremlau, supra note 288, at 3.
398. Mack & Kahn, supra note 384, at 112.
399. For example, twenty-one states made claims in response to the sanctions regime
imposed on Iraq during the 1990s; however, the U.N. took the view that it did not have the
authority to order compensation to be made to them. See Stremlau, supra note 288, at 41.
400. See Doxey, supra note 379, at 185-86.
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to their "special economic problems"; 40 1 however, it offers no guarantee
that their burden will be shared. Supporters of sanctions posit that the U.N.
may avoid these secondary economic effects, and thereby ensure more
effective enforcement, by undertaking preliminary studies to assess
potential economic impacts before sanctions are imposed and by developing
a U.N.-controlled compensation fund for concerned states.
40 2
d. Humanitarian Consequences
Critics argue that sanctions further civilian suffering through adverse
humanitarian effects, as occurred in Iraq during the 1990s. 40 3 Such effects
may include retrogressive impacts on nutrition, mortality rates, public
health, employment rates, commodity shortages, decreased NGO access to
those in need, and declines in economic output.40 4 A sanctions strategy
may aim to force regime change through pressure on the general population,
but these effects may disproportionately harm civilians and can contribute
to a decline in support on the ground for the sending body.
40 5
On the contrary, supporters of smart sanctions assert that they do not
adopt blanket trade embargoes, rather they cause discomfort only to those
responsible for the offending behavior or policy.40 6  In addition, the
Security Council may be able to avoid adverse humanitarian consequences
by crafting its sanctions resolutions to include exceptions for necessary
commodities, which exclude essential food and medicines from trade
restrictions. 40 7  Long-term humanitarian consequences may be further
mitigated by the inclusion of flexible language in Security Council
resolutions, allowing for revisions to lists of targeted individuals or
commodities. Changes on the ground, including in the weather or in
actions by an oppressive regime, may necessitate the expeditious
adjustment of such sanctions lists.40 8  Finally, in order to monitor
violations, gather information on their impacts, and decide on humanitarian
exemptions, the U.N. may also implement sanctions committees before and
during a sanctions program.
40 9
401. U.N. Charter art. 50.
402. See Doxey, supra note 379, at 192; see also Stremlau, supra note 288, at 40-45.
403. See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 4-5, 37.
404. See id at 24 (citing the negative impacts of sanctions on the populations of targeted
nations).
405. See id.
406. See id. at 25.
407. See Geiss, supra note 241, at 180. In 2000, the resolution imposing sanctions on
Afghanistan declared the "'necessity for sanctions to contain adequate and effective
exemptions to avoid adverse humanitarian consequences."' Id. at 186 (quoting S.C. Res.
1333, para. 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000)).
408. See id. at 189.
409. See id. at 186-87.
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e. Summary
If the U.N. chooses to take a new, and perhaps more rigorous, course of
action in response to the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, it will need to
assess the extent of the human rights abuses that have been committed.
Such an assessment must focus on an examination of the various laws and
treaties that may or may not apply to Zimbabwe in order to determine the
extent of the government's accountability. Furthermore, deciding which
course of action to pursue-whether diplomatic negotiation, criminal
prosecution, military action, or sanctions-requires the consideration of a
variety of criticisms, obstacles, and suggestions for effective
implementation. Only then will the U.N. be able to choose an effective
response that is economically and politically feasible, as well as legally
justified.
III. THE U.N. SHOULD IMPOSE "SMART" SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE
The central question of this Note is whether the U.N. ought to pursue a
more aggressive course of action in response to Zimbabwe's humanitarian
crisis, which has been greatly exacerbated by the implementation of
Murambatsvina 410 and the failures of Operation Garikai. 41' To answer this
question, one must settle at least three issues, each of which was raised in
Part II. First, is there a legal basis for a stronger international response?
Second, if so, what is the best approach for the U.N.? Third, in particular,
are sanctions the best way forward?
The goal of any U.N. response should be coercing the Mugabe
government into complying with the stated provisions of Operation
Garikai.412 Part III.A explores the legal justifications of imposing sanctions
and presents smart sanctions as the most politically and economically viable
response currently available to the U.N.-and the one most likely to
succeed in its coercive objectives. Part III.B offers recommendations for a
smart sanctions program specifically designed to target Zimbabwean
officials. Such a program should be narrowly tailored to ensure that only
those specially designated individuals feel its effects 413 and to minimize any
adverse humanitarian and economic effects on the general population 414
and third-party nations.415  Part III.B.1 looks at the general structure,
implementation, and enforcement of sanctions, and Part III.B.2 explores
specific types of sanctions, including arms embargoes and trade, financial,
travel, and diplomatic sanctions, in relation to Zimbabwe.
410. See supra Part I.A.
411. See supra Part I.B.
412. See supra notes 129, 132 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
414. See supra Part II.B.4.d.
415. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
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A. Smart Sanctions as the Most Appropriate U.N. Response Today
1. The Legal Basis for U.N.-Imposed Sanctions
Legally, the Security Council can impose sanctions once it satisfies the
threat to the peace language found in article 39 of the U.N. Charter.4 16 A
brief review of the language of past Security Council resolutions indicates
the possibility and even likelihood that the U.N. would interpret the mass
forced evictions and the failure of the Zimbabwean government to redress
the humanitarian crisis it has caused as satisfying the threat to the peace
requirement. For example, parallels between the language used to describe
specific triggering behaviors and the current situation in Zimbabwe can be
drawn, 4 17 especially with respect to the economic repercussions of the
operations, 4 18 the hundreds of thousands displaced by Murambatsvina, 4 19
the disparate impact the operations have had on women and girls, 42 0 and the
numbers of refugees crossing the border into South Africa. 421
Furthermore, the imposition of Operation Murambatsvina and the failure
of Operation Garikai to address the needs of the displaced constitute
violations of international, customary, and domestic laws and therefore
provide further justification for the imposition of targeted sanctions on
Zimbabwean leaders. In forcibly evicting Zimbabweans from their
homes, 422 causing mass unemployment, 4 23 disrupting health services and
education, 424 and further plunging the economy into disrepair, 425 the
Mugabe government has violated its obligations under the U.N. Charter.4 26
Moreover, the systematic destruction of homes, 427 forced removal of
residents to rural areas,4 28 confiscation of shop stocks, 429 arbitrary
416. U.N. Charter art. 39; see also supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
418. See supra Part I.A.4.d.
419. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Richard Bodreaux, The New
Foreign Aid: Zimbabwe, The Road from Ruin, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 2006, at A1 (describing
how destitute Zimbabweans are illegally crossing the border into South Africa at great risk);
Number of Asylum Seekers in South Africa Rises Sharply in First Quarter, UNHCR News
Stories Online, May 19, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=446dd6dc4 (indicating that in the first
quarter of 2006 the largest number of applicants for asylum in South Africa came from
Zimbabwe).
422. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
423. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
424. See supra Part I.A.4.b-c.
425. See supra Part I.A.4.d.
426. See supra Part II.A. 1.
427. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
429. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 63.
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arrests,430 forcing of homeowners to destroy their own buildings, 431 and
disruption of health care and education432 constitute violations of the rights
set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
433
The government's arguments that the operation is legal under the
Regional, Town and Country Planning Act; 434 article 29 of the Universal
Declaration; 435 or the Zimbabwean Constitution436 fail. For example, on
many occasions during Operation Murambatsvina, residents were given just
a few hours to remove their belongings from their homes before the
structures were destroyed or residents were forced to destroy them
themselves.437 On others, residents who had obtained the authority to build
on the land were evicted anyway. 438 In both instances, the government
pursued its goals in violation of both the notice requirement in the Regional,
Town and Country Planning Act 439 and rights pertaining to the ownership
of property, among others, enumerated in a number of relevant international
treaties440 and in the Zimbabwean Constitution.441 Since Zimbabwe has
signed and ratified these treaties and has not filed any relevant
derogations, 442 its leaders are therefore accountable for any violations of
them. Any claims that Zimbabwe is not accountable under international
human rights law fail in the face of the clear incorporation of those rights
into the Zimbabwean Constitution.443 Such violations provide a foundation
for finding a threat to the peace and therefore for imposing sanctions against
those responsible for the operation and its aftermath.
In addition, any claim that Operation Garikai mitigates these violations is
moot. Conceived after the fact in an attempt to cast Operation
Murambatsvina in a noble light and to head off further international
recriminations that were certain to follow the publication of Tibaijuka's
U.N. report,444 Operation Garikai has failed to provide relief to the
thousands of victims still waiting to be rehoused.445 Woefully inadequate
in the number and quality of homes it has successfully completed, 446 the
430. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
432. See supra Part I.A.4.b-c.
433. See supra Part II.A.2.
434. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, supra note 305.
435. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
436. See Zimb. Const. (as amended at Sept. 14, 2005), ch. III; supra Part II.A.5.
437. See supra notes 19, 62 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
439. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, supra note 305; Part 1.A.3.a.
440. See supra Part II.A.4.
441. See supra Part II.A.5.
442. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
443. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
445. See supra Part I.B.
446. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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operation has been bogged down by a corrupt allocation system 447 and an
unrealistic scheme of charging displaced persons for their resettlement. 448
Construction has all but stopped in most areas,449 and the displaced
continue to cope with their situation without the help of the government.450
The Zimbabwean government's failure to respond effectively to the
humanitarian crisis it created calls for coercive action on the part of the
U.N. With the U.N.'s likely interpretation of the situation as a threat to the
peace and the support of various legal justifications for action, the U.N.
should take a stronger approach in order to push the government to
ameliorate the abuses it continues to inflict on the Zimbabwean population.
2. Negotiations, Prosecution, and Military Action Are Not Appropriate or
Viable Options
This Note presents four options that are available to the U.N. in its
response to Operation Murambatsvina and the deepening humanitarian
crisis in Zimbabwe. 45 1  The first three-diplomatic negotiations,
international criminal prosecution, and military intervention-are not viable
or likely to be successful at this time. Therefore, the U.N. should adopt a
program of smart sanctions in order to coerce the Zimbabwean government
into complying with the guidelines it set out in Operation Garikai 452 and to
send a clear message of disapproval.
First, the U.N.'s program of diplomacy and negotiation 453 is failing as a
response to Operation Murambatsvina and Zimbabwe's difficult political
crisis. 454 Currently, the Mugabe government has rejected U.N. efforts to
extend aid to those still suffering, 455 and the government's plan to rehouse
the displaced has fallen dramatically short of its stated targets. 456 The
U.N.'s long-term reliance on South African President Thabo Mbeki's "quiet
diplomacy" has reaped little change for the Zimbabwean people.457 In fact,
armed police officers continue to forcibly evict residents from their homes
through 2006, and today the nation continues to teeter on the brink of
starvation. 458
447. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
449. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
451. See supra Part 1.C and l.B.
452. See supra notes 129, 132 and accompanying text.
453. See supra Part I.C.1.
454. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 252-65 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
458. See Patience Rusere, Zimbabwe Authorities Pursue Forced Evictions & Demolitions,
Voice of America, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-10/2006-10-
04-voa65.cfm?CFID=90727577&CFTOKEN=73478858 (detailing how local government
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Second, international criminal prosecution of those responsible for
Operation Murambatsvina under the Rome Statute459 is unlikely to produce
any coercive effects and will therefore fail to further the immediate U.N.
goals of creating food stability, employment opportunities, and housing
options for Zimbabweans. 460 The U.N. itself has admitted that the pursuit
of such prosecutions would likely be protracted and would only cause
further debate,461 perhaps even worsening tensions already present in the
country and giving rise to claims of imperialism.462
Third, the crisis in Zimbabwe is not yet ripe for military action. First,
any resolution for military action is likely to face a veto from at least one of
the Security Council's five permanent members. 463 In light of current
American and British obligations in Iraq,464 those nations are unlikely to be
amenable to further commitments of troops and equipment to distant
conflicts. 465 Second, while the possibility of a veto is debatable, it is clear
that all other tools of coercion have not yet been exhausted. 466 Negotiations
with President Mugabe appear to be failing, 467 and the government has
rejected offers of aid,468 but sanctions are still a viable option.
In sum, sanctions are the most appropriate approach both politically and
economically and present perhaps the most likely means of achieving the
U.N.'s goals of fostering international peace and security. 469 While the
situation in Zimbabwe may seem hopeless to many, the U.N., as a
collective of 192 member states,470 possesses an imprimatur that can be
used to do more than simply negotiate with this oppressive regime. A
program of smart sanctions, including financial, arms, trade, travel, and
diplomatic prohibitions,471 would coerce targeted officials to address the
humanitarian crisis precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina and the
failing Operation Garikai, would send a message of international
officials continued to raze dozens of homes in late 2006, giving residents just twenty-four
hours' notice to evacuate); see also supra Part l.A.4.a.
459. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 153.
460. See Tibaijuka, supra note 2, at 74-79.
461. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text (discussing the tensions raised by
ICC prosecution).
463. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
464. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Adding 20,000 U.S. Troops; Sets Goal of Securing
Baghdad, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2007, at Al (discussing President Bush's latest strategy for
success in Iraq and highlighting political opposition to the current commitment of American
troops to the Iraq conflict).
465. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
466. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
467. See supra Part I.C. 1.
468. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
469. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
470. See United Nations, List of Member States,
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
471. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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condemnation 4 72 to Zimbabwean leaders, and would send a rallying call of
support to opposition groups on the ground.4 73
3. Criticism and Concerns over the Implementation of Sanctions
Despite criticisms, the U.N. should impose a program of smart sanctions
against Zimbabwe. Concerns over their success rates, potential misuse,
economic effects, political feasibility, and humanitarian effects are
misplaced. 474  This section argues that a system of smart sanctions
successfully addresses or bypasses each of these criticisms.
The U.N. can easily overcome doubts about the success rate of sanctions
in achieving their stated goals and about its own ability to enforce a
program of sanctions. 475 First, by redefining the factors used to measure
the success of sanctions, the U.N. will focus more on demonstrative goals
rather than on the stated coercive goals. Second, the counter to concerns
over the U.N.'s ability to effectively implement and monitor a smart-
sanctions program lies in its efforts to cultivate local contacts and
international commitment. 476 A robust outreach program designed to
engage local stakeholders and an attempt to mitigate adverse secondary
effects on third-party nations4 77 will contribute greatly to the success of a
U.N. program.
Criticisms that sanctions are susceptible to potential misuse or
disingenuous intentions are misplaced with regard to Zimbabwe.
Allegations that sanctions are simply a pretext for military intervention 478
fail in this case, as it is unlikely that the Security Council could garner
approval for such action in light of the current conflict in Iraq.4 79 Since the
Security Council, acting as a multilateral agent, would be imposing
sanctions in this case, rather than a nation acting unilaterally, its
multicultural membership480  largely preempts claims of racism. 48 1
Moreover, the rights the U.N. seeks to uphold 482 are founded on principles
of antidiscrimination, 483 have been incorporated into Zimbabwean law, 484
472. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 381.
474. See supra Part II.B.4.
475. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
476. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
477. See supra Part I|.B.4.c.
478. See supra notes 387-90 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
480. See supra note 193 and accompanying text; see also U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1
(explaining the process of selection of Security Council members); U.N. Charter art. 24,
para. 1 (conferring on the Security Council the power to act on behalf of the U.N.).
481. See supra notes 383-86 and accompanying text.
482. See supra Part II.A. 1-2.
483. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (describing the goal of the coalition as
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion").
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and form a significant part of the Zimbabwean Constitution.485
Zimbabwe's various ratifications 486 of international treaties and its U.N.
membership 487 also indicate its support, at least rhetorically, of the
principles the U.N. seeks to enforce through a sanctions program. Finally,
Mugabe has already capitalized upon any remaining notions of nationalism
with his regular mischaracterizations of British and U.S. sanctions as
comprehensive and subsequently responsible for the current situation.
488
Any attempt to generate a "rally round the flag effect" 489 by playing on the
population's nationalist emotions likely has occurred already. Therefore,
the imposition of U.N. sanctions will not spark further backlash in
Zimbabwe. Finally, the U.N. can achieve legitimacy for its sanctions
program by exploring whether or not opposition groups have called for
them.490 Considering all of the foregoing, a U.N.-sponsored program of
sanctions should not be susceptible to claims of potential misuse or
imperialist motivations.
In addition, economic concerns over sanctions implementation can easily
be resolved in the case of Zimbabwe. 491 In the event that the U.N. does
impose smart sanctions on Zimbabwe, costs to non-target nations will be
minimal. 492 Smart sanctions will be directed only at ruling-party members
and will not involve comprehensive trade embargoes. Therefore, the cost of
enforcing sanctions to neighboring states will be low,4 9 3 as they will not
need to intrude heavily upon cross-border trading and informal-market
activity among the lower levels of the economy. The effects on
Zimbabwe's economy should also be minimal. Essentially, the
Zimbabwean government has already self-sanctioned 494 the nation with its
484. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
486. See supra Part II.A.4.
487. See supra notes 268, 291 and accompanying text.
488. See supra note 382.
489. See supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
491. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
492. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
493. See supra Part 11.B.4.c.
494. See Online NewsHour: Contested Victory (PBS online broadcast Mar. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june02/elections_3-13.html. In an
interview just after the 2002 Zimbabwean presidential election, Jeffrey Herbst, professor of
international affairs at Princeton University, stated that he thought U.S. and E.U. sanctions
would have little effect on Zimbabwe's political order: "The Mugabe regime has already
done far more damage to the country's economic prospects than outsiders could possibly do.
They've self-sanctioned themselves." Id. Ray Choto, a Zimbabwean journalist who has been
arrested and tortured by the Zimbabwean military for his work, also commented on
sanctions, stating,
Well, I mean the sanctions, especially if they are targeted on certain
individuals, that's fine. I mean I am opposed to sanctions, which would be
targeted at the country as a whole, because I mean the people who are fighting
against the Mugabe regime trying to make sure that it does respect the rule of law
will be punished at the end of the day.
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failing economic policies,495 massive government-induced unemployment
and homelessness, 496 and inability to work with states that are already
imposing unilateral targeted sanctions. 49 7  Although reliable statistics
pertaining to Zimbabwe's economy are unavailable, it is clear that over the
past five or more years agricultural output and the country's gross domestic
product have contracted sharply.49 8 These indicators reflect the fact that the
nation has neither the currency nor the demand to import goods or the
productivity to export them, and further restrictions on such transactions
should not have a great effect on what is largely an informal economy or on
the trade activity of neighboring states.499 Since most major Western
nations have already implemented smart sanctions against President
Mugabe and other high-ranking officials, 500 any further economic impact of
U.N.-imposed sanctions on the general population should be minimal.
Therefore, economic concerns with respect to non-target nations are not a
primary consideration with respect to a smart sanctions program in
Zimbabwe.
Finally, concerns over the humanitarian effects of sanctions are
misplaced. More specifically, smart sanctions as applied to Zimbabwe
should not result in any extreme adverse effects on the Zimbabwean
population. The program will not cause inadvertent harm if it is targeted
only at those responsible for Operation Murambatsvina, 50 1 includes
exemptions for any potentially targeted necessary commodities, 50 2 and
includes flexible language in order to adapt to changing circumstances on
the ground.50 3 To be sure, the U.N. will need to monitor implementation
carefully and effectively, 50 4 but with basic monitoring frameworks in place,
the U.N. can avoid any adverse humanitarian effects.
A U.N.-imposed smart sanctions program in Zimbabwe is a practical
choice. By setting a demonstrative goal for the program, in addition to the
usual coercive goals, the U.N. can measure its success by factors other than
Therefore, the selective use of these sanctions, the smart sanctions, I think is
the best way forward to go.
Id.
495. See Wines, supra note 23 (discussing Operation Sunrise).
496. See supra Part I.A.
497. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
498. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund (IMF), Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, at
72-73, IMF Country Report No. 05/359 (2005) (indicating sharp decreases in Zimbabwe's
agricultural output and gross domestic product).
499. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
500. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. Incidentally, the implementation of
these unilateral sanctions indicates strong political will for a U.N.-imposed sanctions
program. For further discussion, see supra note 368, indicating that China and Russia might
not exercise its veto power against proposed U.N. sanctions.
501. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
502. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
503. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
504. See supra note 409 and accompanying text.
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regime change or even compliance. If the U.N. cultivates local contacts and
ensures robust international commitment to effectively enforce the program,
the sanctions should be successful. Secondary economic impacts should be
minimal due to Zimbabwe's financial crisis, but the U.N. should undertake
preliminary studies to assess the impact on third-party nations to ensure that
these effects are mitigated as much as possible. Any adverse humanitarian
effects can be avoided with the careful tailoring of the program to target
only those responsible for Operation Murambatsvina, to include exemptions
for necessary goods, and to include flexible language. These
recommendations fully address the criticisms of sanctions, making the
imposition of smart sanctions a viable next step against Zimbabwean
officials.
B. Recommendations: Drafting a Model Sanctions Program for Zimbabwe
The choice of sanctions as an appropriate response to Operations
Murambatsvina and Garikai requires crafting a plan that will affect only
those responsible for the destruction. This section offers recommendations
for such a plan, first looking at its construction via language and
enforcement and then looking at the coercive approaches that may be
implemented through it.
1. Language, Implementation, and Enforcement
In designing a program of smart sanctions for Zimbabwe, the U.N.
should focus on the language of the program and provisions for its
implementation and enforcement. Drawing on recommendations made by
the Security Council's Informal Working Group on General Issues of
Sanctions, 505 the Stockholm Process, 50 6 various academics, and the unique
characteristics of the situation in Zimbabwe, this section suggests ways the
U.N. can build an effective smart-sanctions program.
The text of the Security Council's sanctions mandate must be clear in
several ways. The list of targeted individuals must be as accurate as
possible, and the resolution should include a means of redress for those who
wish to challenge their inclusion.50 7  Unambiguous definitions of
restrictions must also be included, especially with respect to financial and
trade transactions. 50 8 The means of compliance that will result in the lifting
or easing of sanctions must be clearly spelled out, so that targeted
505. See Chairman of the Informal Working Group of the Sec. Council on Gen. Issues of
Sanctions, Chairman's Proposed Outcome (Sept. 26, 2002),
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/conmittees/sanctions/Propout 10.pdf [hereinafter Proposed
Outcome].
506. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235.
507. See id. at 97-98.
508. See id. at 96.
[Vol. 76
2007] UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE 381
individuals are aware of what is expected of them. 50 9 In this respect, the
U.N. should be careful not to "move the goalposts"51 0 during the sanctions
period, instead adhering to objectives that are clearly and concisely framed.
Small, carefully iterated goals will help with clarity. Finally, the text
should include a sunset clause, which provides a time frame for
compliance. 5 11 On the same note, the Security Council may also consider
including deadlines for the easing of sanctions in response to partial
compliance. 5 12 Ultimately, ensuring that the text includes clear demands
will aid in enforcement and in ensuring compliance.
In modeling a sanctions program specific to Zimbabwe, the U.N. should
draw on the above recommendations. First, an investigation into the target
lists already in place in the unilateral sanctions program of the United
States, the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand will help to
determine who the U.N. should target.5 13 The list will likely include a
majority of ZANU-PF officials in local and national government, including
President Mugabe, his family members, business partners, and any other
individuals or groups likely to transact business on his behalf. In addition,
the U.N. should focus on the objectives set forth in Operation Garikai,
which largely focus on the construction of new homes for the displaced and
the creation of jobs through the allocation of plots of land.5 14 Such goals
are directly linked to stabilizing the economy. The U.N. should tie these
goals to negotiations with the current regime, requiring President Mugabe
to permit the U.N. to assist in achieving a more stable monetary policy and
allow aid into the country. Finally, the U.N. should set an initial deadline
of six months with a provision for renewal after the first series of
negotiations. These recommendations provide the Security Council with a
starting point for drafting a Zimbabwe-specific resolution.
In implementing the program, the Security Council should pay particular
attention to humanitarian exemptions, 5 15 methods of assessment of
progress, 5 16 and adverse effects on the general population 5 17 and third-party
509. See Proposed Outcome, supra note 505, at 4. Sanctions must be narrowly construed
with clear goals and perhaps provisions for pre-assessment studies. See Cortright & Lopez,
supra note 210, at 5; see also Stremlau, supra note 288, at 53 (calling for an improvement in
the precision of resolution language). This lack of clarity is compounded by the fact that the
U.N. often relies on the language of past resolutions, resulting in a lack of individuality and
responsiveness to the specific situation. See id.
510. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 210, at 6.
511. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 96-97; see also Proposed Outcome, supra
note 505, at 4.
512. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 26; see also Cortright & Lopez, supra note
210, at 5-6; Proposed Outcome, supra note 505, at 4.
513. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
514. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
515. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 510-11 and accompanying text.
517. See supra Part II.B.4.d.
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states.518 In so doing, the Security Council should conduct pre-assessment
reports to determine the specific needs and possible negative effects of the
program. 519  Relying on these reports, the Security Council should
determine what, if any, exemptions are required for humanitarian purposes,
including food, medical supplies, educational items, and nonlethal military
equipment.520 During implementation, applications for further exemptions
should be dealt with immediately. 521 In addition, the U.N. should also seek
regular evaluations from in-country representatives to determine the impact
and success of the sanctions and accept recommendations for modifications
to them.522 In that vein, effects on the population can extend into the post-
sanctions period and the U.N. should continue its monitoring duties
accordingly. 523
While enforcement of sanctions depends on member states, the U.N.
should make provisions for assisting those states. Such provisions will
include providing mechanisms for the investigation of potential violations
and immediately conveying any reports of violations to the relevant
member state. 524 Similarly, the U.N. should also conduct a survey of the
potential effects on third-party nations to ensure that they are equipped to
confront violations occurring at their borders. 525  With respect to
Zimbabwe, these measures will involve engaging border countries such as
South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia in discussions
to determine their enforcement needs during the program and to evaluate
any unintended negative effects. The U.N. should involve these
governments at every stage in order to ensure enforcement.
To craft an effective sanctions program, the U.N. needs to communicate
with local groups on all levels. Clear language in the resolution will let
targeted groups know what is expected of them, and discussions with local
and international NGOs as well as neighboring states can help to assess the
presence of unintended consequences and enforcement obstacles. While
individual member states bear the responsibility of enforcing sanctions, the
U.N. must be clear about what is expected from all parties involved.
2. Types of Smart Sanctions for Zimbabwe
A program of smart sanctions depends on a mixture of types of sanctions,
each one intended to alter the cost-benefit analysis of engaging in the
518. See supra Part 1I.B.4.c.
519. See Proposed Outcome, supra note 505, at 4.
520. See id. at 5; see also Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 112.
521. See Proposed Outcome, supra note 505, at 5.
522. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 21; see also Proposed Outcome, supra
note 505, at 6.
523. See Geiss, supra note 241, at 198.
524. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 59; see also Proposed Outcome, supra
note 505, at 7.
525. See supra Part I1.B.4.c.
[Vol. 76
2007] UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE 383
offensive behavior in a specific way. 526 The program against Zimbabwe
should include trade, financial, travel, and diplomatic sanctions, as well as
an arms embargo. The U.N. program should build on the unilateral
programs already put in place against Zimbabwe by Western nations,527
which include many of these elements.
First, the U.N. should include trade sanctions on businesses owned by
targeted members of the government and their family members and
associates. This is particularly relevant in the agricultural sector since many
officials were allocated commercial farms in the land-redistribution
program. 528 However, the U.N. should carefully monitor the effects of
trade sanctions, especially on agriculture, to be certain the country has the
required inputs to produce food supplies for the general population and to
ensure that the sanctions do not cause further unemployment of non-target
individuals. In response to partial compliance on the part of Zimbabwean
officials, a gradual easing of trade sanctions may prove necessary to achieve
the goals of creating jobs and food security. The U.N. should also impose
trade sanctions on luxury goods, as proposed in the sanctions program
against North Korea. 529 Such goods are out of the financial reach of the
majority of Zimbabweans, so a ban would affect only the targeted elite and
likely would not have a great impact on third-party businesses. Combining
prohibitions on trade transactions with bans on luxury goods should inflict a
heavy cost on targeted officials.
Second, the U.N. should include provisions for freezing the foreign-held
assets of targeted individuals, their family members, and their business
partners. 530 These provisions should include blocks on all credit and loans
for these individuals, as well as a bar on all non-humanitarian governmental
assistance.53 1 Admittedly, enforcement of such a bar is difficult, especially
in locations where technology is not adequate; 532 however, progress is
continually being made. 53 3
Third, the U.N. should impose robust travel bans on all government
officials and their families and business partners. 534 These provisions
should include travel for medical purposes, forcing officials to rely instead
526. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
527. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
528. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
529. See Ted Bridis, U.S. Bans Sale of iPods to North Korea, USA Today, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-11-29-nkorea-ipod-ban-x.htm.
530. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 72-73 (offering guidance on
implementing freezes on financial assets).
531. See David Cortright, George A. Lopez & Elizabeth S. Rogers, Targeted Financial
Sanctions: Smart Sanctions That Do Work, in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic
Statecraft, supra note 227, at 23, 23.
532. See id. at 32-37.
533. See id. at 37.
534. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 74 (offering guidance on implementing
travel bans, including visa restrictions).
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on the medical system in their home country. Exemptions should only be
permitted for international negotiation sessions. 535 In conjunction with
these prohibitions, the U.N. should also impose diplomatic sanctions on
Zimbabwe, prohibiting officials from participating in international events
and suspending the nation from the U.N. under article 5 of the charter. 536
The imposition of travel and diplomatic sanctions imposes a symbolic and
psychological cost, demonstrating international rejection of the targeted
parties.537 Such an effect aids in reaching the demonstrative goals of the
sanctions program.
Finally, the U.N. should impose an arms embargo 538 on Zimbabwe. In
Zimbabwe, the government's threats of violence are currently potent
enough to avoid violent clashes; however, the situation could ignite at any
moment, as evidenced by the political disruptions seen earlier this year.539
A prohibition on the sale of arms to the state would not only diffuse the
possibility of a long-term conflict erupting, it would also limit the ability of
targeted individuals to profit from transactions in the sale of arms. 540 An
arms embargo works together with the other sanctions to limit individuals'
finances.
C. Summary
The U.N. should carefully craft its smart sanctions program to inflict the
maximum amount of coercive pressure on targeted officials while
minimizing any unintended adverse effects. When drafting its resolution,
the Security Council should include clear, well-defined compliance
535. See Douglas Southgate, Turn Your Eyes to Zimbabwe, N.Y. Sun, Sept. 20, 2006, at 7
(highlighting President Mugabe's recent trip to New York for a meeting of the U.N. General
Assembly). Much to international dismay, Portugal recently extended an invitation to
President Mugabe to attend a summit of E.U. and African nations in Lisbon; however,
Portuguese officials indicated that they "hope[d that] he will be clever enough not to come."
See Mugabe to Be Invited to EU Summit, BBC News, July 2, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6261656.stm. A representative of the British Conservative
party declared, "The Portuguese presidency is sending out a terrible signal that we are
prepared to do business with dictators." Id.
536. U.N. Charter art. 5. Article 5 declares that
[a] Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action
has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the
rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and
privileges may be restored by the Security Council.
Id.
537. See Richard W. Conroy, The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions, in Smart
Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, supra note 227, at 145, 163.
538. See Stockholm Report, supra note 235, at 70-71 (offering guidance on the
implementation of arms embargoes).
539. See Mugabe Rival "Asked for Beating," BBC News, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6508813.stm.
540. See Loretta Bondi, Arms Embargoes: In Name Only?, in Smart Sanctions:
Targeting Economic Statecraft, supra note 227, at 109, 113.
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provisions and a sunset clause, so that all parties understand what is
expected of them. The sanctions program should not only focus on
implementing the rehousing goals of Operation Garikai but will also need to
include negotiations with the U.N. in order to pursue such longer-term goals
as economic stability, employment, and food security. The resolution
should include exemptions for necessary humanitarian needs, including
food and medical supplies, and the U.N. should work with local and
international NGOs and neighboring countries to monitor the effects of the
sanctions program both during and after its implementation. A successful
smart sanctions program against Zimbabwe will include trade embargoes
against targeted individuals and businesses, and on luxury goods; the
freezing of the financial assets of targeted individuals; robust travel
prohibitions, including provisions for diplomatic exclusion; and an arms
embargo. These recommendations provide a framework for crafting a
successful draft resolution for smart sanctions against Zimbabwean
officials.
CONCLUSION
In framing a response to gross violations of human rights law, as seen in
Zimbabwe during Operation Murambatsvina and in the failure of Operation
Garikai, the U.N. has a range of tools available. In this case, the U.N.
should impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for the
continuing human rights violations. While the economic and humanitarian
situation in the country prior to May 2005 was in a downward spiral,54 1 the
brutal efficiency with which the government displaced nearly one million
people542 calls for an international response. Not only did the operation
directly affect the victims' housing and employment situations,543 but it
also carried disastrous knock-on effects in the health care, education, and
economic sectors of society.544 Thus far, the U.N. has taken little official
action to express its disapproval,545 and the human rights abuses continue
with impunity. 546
The U.N. has a variety of responses available, ranging from diplomacy to
military intervention; however, as is so often the case, the situation calls for
an immediate coercive strategy that can only be achieved through the
implementation of targeted sanctions. Such sanctions impose a heavy cost
on officials responsible for the devastation, causing them to recalculate the
benefits of allowing the nation to suffer. Moreover, a sanctions program
sends a clear message of warning to other nations facing similar issues, of
541. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
542. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
543. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
544. See supra Part I.A.4.b-d.
545. See supra Part I.D.
546. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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support to those suffering, and of outrage to the perpetrators of these
crimes.
Imposing a smart sanctions program is justified on many levels.
Operation Murambatsvina violated a host of international, regional, and
local human rights laws, which creates a legal justification (although one is
not required) for U.N. action. Concerns over the feasibility and potential
harmful effects of sanctions can easily be mitigated or avoided entirely with
strong international commitment to enforcement, careful and continual
monitoring, consultation with local and international NGOs, and precise
drafting.
The international community as a whole must not consent to the mass
suffering that the Mugabe regime and other governments continue to inflict
on citizens around the world. Undoubtedly, in this case, Zimbabweans will
continue to feel the effects of Operation Murambatsvina for years to come;
at the very least, the U.N. should attempt to move beyond its failed efforts
at diplomacy with a man who has ruled with impunity for decades. 547 A
program of smart sanctions serves as a channel for U.N. disapproval of this
government-induced disaster, sets an example to other governments
engaging in similar human rights violations, creates a U.N. precedent for
future enforcement actions, and generates momentum for change in a
country that desperately needs it.
547. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. Despite the upcoming 2008
Zimbabwean presidential elections and despite rumors of political negotiations, the U.N.
should take a stronger stance to express its disapproval. Past elections have proven flawed,
and Mbeki has made no public statement about any negotiated political compromises. See
supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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